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 This dissertation studies the sources of the momentum abnormal returns.  The first 
essay attempts to find the relative role of cross-sectional and time-series variances in 
generating returns from the momentum strategy.  By decomposing the returns from the 
momentum strategy both theoretically and empirically, the first essay finds that own-
stock autocovariance is an important source in generating momentum returns.  More 
interestingly, the own-stock autocovariance comes primarily from the loser portfolio.  
This finding provides another explanation to the recent finding that the loser portfolio is 
the driving force of the momentum abnormal returns.   
 Based on the above discovery from the first essay, the second essay attempts to 
find out the underlying reason for the important asymmetric own-stock autocovaraince 
from the loser portfolio.  We find that this return predictability comes from the short-
selling constraints and risks.  Stocks with more severe short-selling constraints prevent 
pessimistic information from being released into the stock prices more quickly; and thus 
















Table               Page 










II. Literature Review 9 
2.1. Stock Trading Strategies 9 
2.2. Literature Review 11 
III. Decomposition of Momentum Returns 22 
3.1. Theoretical Model 22 
3.2. Circumstance in Generating Positive Momentum Returns 29 
IV. Empirical Results 30 
4.1. An Empirical Appraisal of Momentum Returns 30 
V. Conclusions 37 
LIST OF REFERENCES 39 
APPENDIX 49 
CHAPTER III 53 
SHORT-SELLING CONSTRAINTS AND MOMENTUM ABNORMAL RETURNS 53 
Abstract 53 
I. Introduction 54 
II. Short-Selling Risks 62 
2.1. Short-Selling Mechanics 62 
2.2. Short-Selling Risks 63 
2.3. SEC Pilot Program 65 
III. Literature Review 65 
3.1. Market Frictions Explanation 66 
3.2. Proxies for Short-selling Constraints 69 
3.3. Other Factors Influencing Short-Selling Risk 73 
IV. Theory and Hypotheses 77 
V. Data and Methodology 80 
5.1. Summary Statistics 83 
5.2. Pooled Interval Regression and the True Demand for Shorting 85 
VI. Estimated Realizable Shorting Demand and Short-selling Constraints 88 
6.1. Short Interest Ratio and Institutional Ownership 88 
6.2. Estimated Interval Regression Model 90 
6.3. Short-selling Constraints 95 
vi 
 
VII. Short-selling Constraints and Momentum Abnormal Returns 96 
7.1. Portfolio Sorts on Short-selling Constraints 96 
7.2. Momentum Strategy and Short-selling Constraints 100 
7.3. Risk Adjustments 101 
7.4. NASDAQ Effect 106 
7.5. Reg. SHO Pilot Program 108 
VIII. Conclusions 112 



































LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table               Page 
 
Table 1. Return Decomposition with All Stocks in the U.S. Market ................................ 43 
Table 2. Return Decomposition with NYSE & AMEX Stocks Only ............................... 46 
Table 3. Return Decomposition with Change of Weights ................................................ 47 
Table 4. Return Decomposition following Lo & MacKinlay (1990) ............................... 48 
Table 5. Summary Statistics ........................................................................................... 121 
Table 6. Summary Statistics of SIR and IOS .................................................................. 122 
Table 7. Pooled Interval Regression ............................................................................... 123 
Table 8. Double Sorting .................................................................................................. 124 
Table 9. Double Sorting of SC and RET ........................................................................ 126 
Table 10. Factor Models ................................................................................................. 127 
Table 11. Short-squeeze Risk & Factor Models ............................................................. 129 
Table 12. Momentum Returns with and without NASDAQ Stocks ............................... 131 
Table 13. NASDAQ Effect ............................................................................................. 132 
Table 14. Summary Statistics of Pilot and Control Sample before the Pilot Program ... 132 




























LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure           Page 
 
Figure 1. SIR and IOS ..................................................................................................... 119 






 Abnormal returns generated from the momentum strategy have puzzled finance 
researchers for more than twenty years.  The underlying sources of abnormal returns from the 
momentum strategy have provoked heated debate and rethinking about the widely-accepted 
concept---efficient market hypothesis, which is central to finance.  However, momentum 
strategy---of all the market anomalies, most seriously challenged the efficient market hypothesis 
even in the weak form.  
 This dissertation attempts to explain the abnormal returns from the momentum strategy 
from two different aspects.  The first essay develops a theoretical model to decompose the 
returns generated from the momentum strategy.  By utilizing the historical data, the first essay 
supports the finding of Lehmann (1990) that autocorrelation of own stock returns is one of the 
driving forces for the expected momentum returns.  More importantly to the literature, the first 
essay finds the own-autocovariance in the winner portfolio is almost negligible compared to that 
of the loser portfolio.  Thus, it provides another underlying reason to the recent finding that the 
contribution of the winner and loser portfolios to the momentum returns is asymmetric.  
Therefore, the market may not be as efficient as we previously believed.  Furthermore, from the 
return decomposition, we know the direct link that researchers typically put between the 
positivity of the momentum abnormal returns and the market inefficiency may not obviously 
hold. Based on the findings from the first essay, we further investigate the underlying reason 
for the persistence of the own-stock autocovariance in the loser portfolio, which may lead to its 
asymmetric contribution to the momentum abnormal returns.  In the second essay, we find that 
the short-selling constraints and risk cause the autocovariance in the loser stock returns, and 
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explain the momentum abnormal returns from the loser portfolio strongly and independently.  
Stocks which have most short-selling constraints generate the lowest returns.  This return 
prediction in the momentum strategy supports the mispricing explanation that stocks with more 
severe short-selling constraints prevent pessimistic information from being released into the 
stock price more quickly; and thus causes those stocks to be more overpriced and auto-correlated 





























UNDERSTANDING THE SOURCES OF ABNORMAL RETURNS FROM 




   In this thesis, we study the sources of the returns from the momentum strategy and 
attempt to find some hints for the heated debate on the market efficiency hypothesis that has 
occurred over the past twenty years.  By decomposing the momentum returns from a 
mathematical model, we directly investigated the contributors and their relative importance in 
generating these momentum returns.   
Our empirical results indicated that the autocorrelation of own stock returns is one of the 
driving forces for the expected momentum returns.  The magnitude of the autocorrelation 
decreased as the ranking period became more remote.  The second important source came from 
the cross-sectional variation of the expected returns in the winner and loser portfolios for a given 
time.  The third important source was the difference of the expected returns between the winner 
and loser portfolios.   To our surprise, the cross-autocovariance did not contribute significantly to 
the expected momentum returns.  Thus, the lead-lag effect can cause momentum returns, but its 
impact is not as significant as we had anticipated.  
More importantly, by changing the weights of the winner and loser portfolios, we found 
that the own-autocovariance of the winner portfolio was virtually negligible, compared to that of 
the loser portfolio.  The returns of the winners were much more random than those of the losers.  
This asymmetric own-autocovariance found in the return decomposition provided further support 
for the recent finding that the contribution of the winner and loser portfolios to the momentum 
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returns is asymmetric, and it is the losers, rather than the winners, that drive the momentum 
returns.   





In the 1970s the efficient market hypothesis was widely accepted among finance 
researchers.  It has been commonly believed that information spreads in the market very quickly, 
and hence, the prices of securities can quickly reflect the information with minimal delay.  Thus, 
neither the technical analysis of past stock price behavior nor the fundamental analysis of firm 
specific information can help investors beat the market and earn returns higher than those of 
randomly selected portfolios with comparable risk.  As stated by Malkiel (2003), in efficient 
financial markets, no investor can earn above-average returns without accepting above-average 
risks.  This efficient market hypothesis has been engrained in much of the modern theoretical and 
empirical research in financial economics.  
However, two decades ago, researchers found that simple investment strategies based on 
the past returns of stocks might realize consistently positive abnormal returns.  These rejections 
of the martingale behavior of stock prices have seriously challenged the foundation of even the 
weakform of the efficient market hypothesis.    
Stock return predictability based on past returns alone has attracted considerable attention 
in finance.  The literature has three documented stock trading strategies categorized in terms of 
time horizons: (a) short-term reversal (Jegadeesh, 1990, Lo and MacKinlay, 1990); (b) 
intermediate momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (JT), 1993); and (c) long-term reversal (Debondt 
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and Thaler, 1985, Fama and French, 1988).  As evidence opposing the efficient market 
hypothesis, these stock trading strategies are typical examples of exploiting stock return 
predictability.  The debate on the abnormal returns from the momentum strategy that sells the 
“losers” and buys the “winners” over a 3 to 12 month horizon is much more diverse and 
voluminous.   
This paper focuses on momentum strategy, which—of all the strategies identified—most 
seriously challenges the market efficiency hypothesis (Fama, 1998).  Unlike either the short-term 
contrarian strategy that provides too little time and requires too much cost for possible arbitrage 
or the long-term contrarian strategy, that is not robust to risk adjustment (Fama and French, 
1996) and is subject to measurement problems(Ball, Kothari and Shanken, 1995), the 
intermediate-term momentum strategy shows strong persistence in both the U.S. and 
international markets (Asness, Liew and Stevens, 1997, Rouwenhorst, 1998), and continues to 
exist for post 1990 periods (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001).  The persistence of the abnormal 
momentum returns after the sample period of the original studies diminishes the possibility of 
data snooping bias and positions it as a more serious anomaly than other well studied anomalies 
such as “the small firm effect” and “the value/growth stock phenomenon, “both of which 
disappear after the sample periods in the original studies (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001).   
Many serious attempts have been made to explain the abnormal momentum returns from 
various market phenomena.  Proponents of rational explanations argue that the profitability of 
momentum strategies is explained by bearing some sort of additional risks; and, therefore, the 
market is at least weak-form efficient (Conrad and Kaul, 1998, Berk, Green and Naik, 1999, 
Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002, and Lewellen, 2002).  Proponents of behavioral explanations 
argue that no risk factors can completely absorb the abnormal momentum returns; rather, it is the 
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manner in which irrational investors interpret the information that causes the momentum or 
pattern of stock returns (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, 2001, Barberis, Shleiferand Vishny, 1998, 
Daniel, Hirschleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998, and Hong and Stein, 1999).  Therefore, the 
abnormal returns from momentum strategies constitute strong evidence that the market is not 
even weak-form efficient.  The middle position between the above two schools of thought 
focuses on market friction explanations.  Proponents of market friction argue that parts or all of 
the abnormal momentum returns are justified by some kind of transaction costs in the imperfect 
market (Lesmond, Schilland Zhou, 2004, Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004, Sadka, 2006, and Ali and 
Trombley, 2006).  Nevertheless, the empirical results of the market friction explanations are 
mixed with respect to market efficiency.    
 
1.2. Motivation  
 
 In the literature, there are two ways to address the sources of the returns from the 
momentum strategy.  Some studies attempt to determine the sources of the momentum returns by 
return decomposition.  Expected return decomposition is important because we can determine 
clearly and directly how the time-series and cross-sectional variations play in generating returns 
from the momentum strategy.  The other line of literature attempts to explain why the 
aforementioned components can generate abnormal momentum returns.  If the researchers 
believe the cross-sectional variation is the cause of the momentum returns, then they are 
proponents of the rational explanation.  They attempt to discover risk factors that can fully 
absorb the abnormal returns from the momentum strategy.  On the contrary, if the researchers 
believe the time-series variation is the cause to the momentum returns, then they are advocates of 
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the behavioral finance explanation.  As a result, they attempt to use psychological theories to 
explain the autocorrelation of the stock returns from the momentum strategy.    
 This essay is an example of the first line of literature and attempts to decompose the 
momentum returns and determine the major contributors to the momentum strategy.  Unlike the 
rational explanations that reject any possibility of stock return autocorrelation in generating 
momentum returns or the behavioral explanations that attribute all the momentum returns to the 
stock return patterns, we hypothesize that both own stock return autocovariances and cross-
sectional variances generate the returns from the momentum strategy.  However, the focus is 
determining which component is the main contributor.  This thesis first decomposes the 
momentum expected returns and then uses historical data to calculate the relative weight of each 
component in the momentum returns.   
 Lehmann (1990) made the first attempt in literature to decompose the returns from the 
contrarian strategy.  The weight used in Lehmann (1990) is , where 
∑ .  Built on Lehmann (1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990) further advanced the 
return decomposition.  They use the weight  	 	 	 1, … , .  All 
the later studies follow Lo and MacKinlay (1990) return decomposition, including those by 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) and Lewellen (2002).   
 Our return decomposition in this thesis is based on that of Lo and MacKinlay (1990).  
However, unlike the previous studies that include all stocks in the return decomposition, our 
weighting scheme only picks the top winners and bottom losers in the portfolio.  Our model 
reflects the most common momentum strategy that has been analyzed in the literature, in which 
only a proportion of stocks ranked as winners or losers are weighted in the strategy.  This type of 
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strategy also takes better advantage of potential stock return patterns if any exist.  Top winners 
and bottom losers have more tendency to retain a more stable return pattern.  Thus, only 
including those stocks better reflects the beliefs of investors and avoids potential stock return 
pattern noises from the intermediate portfolio stocks.  Furthermore, this type of momentum 
strategy reflects the stronger belief of investors in the stock return continuation thus could 
generate additional abnormal returns and pose a greater challenge to the efficient market 
hypothesis.  More importantly, unlike the previous return decomposition that investigated the 
component from the whole portfolio, our weighting scheme provides the possibility of further 
investigating the components from the winner and loser portfolios separately.  As the recent 
literature indicates that the winners and losers are quite different in characteristics and that their 
contributions to the abnormal momentum returns are asymmetric, our separate investigation of 
the components in the winner and loser portfolios provides us an opportunity to discover the 
potential cause of this recent finding in the literature.  This is the first study to investigate the 
components in the winner and loser portfolios in return decomposition.   
Our empirical results indicate that both the own stock return autocovariances and cross-
sectional variances are the two major contributors to the momentum returns.   However, the 
cross-autocovariances do not play such an important role in explaining the momentum returns as 
other studies have proposed.   
More interestingly, although the own-autocovariances of the winner and loser portfolios 
bear the same sign, their magnitudes are quite asymmetric.  Compared to the winners, the losers 
have much more stable return patterns and hence much larger own stock autocovariances from 
the ranking period to the holding period.  This provides additional support to the recent finding 
that the losers, rather than the winners, are the driving force of the abnormal momentum returns.   
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All of these results indicate that the market may not be as efficient as we previously 
believed.    
 
II. Literature Review 
2.1. Stock Trading Strategies 
 
 Three stock trading strategies that utilize only the technical analysis and derive consistent 
positive profits are short-term contrarian strategy, intermediate-term momentum strategy, and 
long-term contrarian strategy.  Of these three stock trading strategies, returns from the 
momentum strategy are most robust and therefore are the focus of our study.  These three stock 
trading strategies all consist of a time line of three periods: formation period, holding period and 
post-holding period.  The strategies select stocks on the basis of returns over the past K periods 
(formation period) and hold them for J periods (holding period).   
 
2.1a Short-term Contrarian Strategy 
 
 The short-term contrarian strategy was first documented by Jegadeesh (1990) and 
Lehmann (1990).  It is the strategy that ranks the stocks in the past K periods, which is typically 
a week or a month.  Then construct the portfolio by buying the past worst performing stocks and 
selling the past best performing stocks, and hold it for another J periods, which is also a week or 





2.1b Intermediate Momentum Strategy 
 
First documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the momentum strategy selects stocks 
on the basis of returns over the past K periods (formation period) and holds them for J periods 
(holding period).  The typical length for J and K are three to twelve months.  Some studies also 
wait S periods between the formation and holding period to avoid microstructure effects.  This is 
denoted as the skip period.  This paper, as many other studies, measures periods in months, so J, 
K and S are in months.  To simplify, all the momentum strategies in this paper will be described 
as (K, S, J).  To increase the testing power, the strategy includes overlapping holding periods.  
Therefore, in any given month t, the strategy holds a series of portfolios that are selected in the 
current month as well as in the previous K-1 months if there are no skip months.   
In the formation period, the securities are ranked in descending order on the basis of their 
geometric returns over this period.  The long portfolio or the “winners” consists of equally 
weighted top P percent securities.  The short portfolio or the “losers” consists of equally 
weighted bottom P percent securities.  In much of the literature, P is 10 percent.  Some studies 
also use value weighted (measured by market capitalization) P percent securities. 
This paper will focus on the (6,0,1) equally-weighted rolling strategy and the (6,0,6) 
equally-weighted nonrolling strategy.    
 
2.1c Long-term Contrarian Strategy 
 
 DeBondt and Thaler (1985) first documented profits from the long-term contrarian 
strategy.  Based on the stocks’ past three year performance, the portfolio selects the winners and 
losers, and holds them for another three year period.  Since the past losers continuously 
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outperform the past winners, this contrarian strategy of buying the past losers and selling the past 
winners obtains positive raw returns consistently.  
 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
 Voluminous researches try to identify the sources of abnormal returns from the 
momentum strategy.  There are two categories of studies in tackling this issue.  The first category 
of studies tries to discover the sources by decomposing the momentum returns into cross 
sectional and time series variances.  The second category of studies focuses on providing 
different explanations for the cross-sectional or times-series variances in momentum abnormal 
returns.   
 
2.2a Return Decomposition 
 
Lehmann (1990) has suggested market inefficiency due to stock price “overreaction”.  He 
constructed a contrarian strategy by buying the past k period losers and selling the past k period 
winners on a weekly basis.  However, this zero cost strategy earns positive profits due to the 
phenomenon that the past winners tend to lose and past losers tend to win in the current period.  
Lehmann attributes this stock price predictability to stock price “overreaction” in the previous 
period.  For a given set of N securities over a T time periods in the portfolio, at the beginning of 
period t, buy	  dollars of each security i. The weights are given by 
 	 ; 		 	∑ . 
The profits for the portfolio in period , 	  are  
 , ∑ = ∑ ,  
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so that the average profit over the T periods on this portfolio strategy is  
 ∑ , ∑ ∑ . 
Algebraic manipulation of this expression yields 
 ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , 
where  
 ∑ ;	 ∑  
are the average returns of the equally weighted portfolio and of security i overtime, respectively.  
Therefore, average portfolio profits over the T periods depend on the autocovariances of the 
returns of an equally weighted portfolio, the autocovariances of the returns of the individual 
securities, and the cross-sectional variation in the unconditional mean returns of the individual 
securities.  
Jegadeesh (1990) also presents empirical evidence of predictability of individual stock 
returns on a monthly basis.  He first tests serial correlation properties of individual security 
returns by checking coefficient signs of the following regression: 	
∑  (1), where  is the mean monthly return of 
security i in the sample period t+1 to t+60.  This regression estimates show strong serial reversal 
that the slope coefficients at lag one,  is negative with a significant t-statistic of -18.58.  While 
the coefficients of  and  are negative and demonstrate the return serial reversal in the 
regression, the rest of the coefficients are positive and indicate return serial momentum.  
Jegadeesh also examines the return serial correlation from the portfolio perspective.  Three 
different reading strategies are developed. S0 forecasts individual stock raw returns by using the 
following model: ∑ , where ’s are 
13 
 
estimated from a regression model similar to the regression model (1), with the raw return   as 
the dependent variable over the period t-60 to t-1, and these estimates are updated every month.  
Then ten portfolios are formed by descending ranking order of the predicted returns, and they are 
updated every month too.  S1 and S12 strategies also form ten portfolios on the basis of the one-
month and twelve-month lagged returns.  Finally, the abnormal returns earned by the portfolios 
formed in the above three strategies are estimated under the market model of  
, where and  are the portfolio return and the risk-free rate 
respectively. The intercept is the abnormal return of the above strategies.  The results of the three 
strategies all demonstrate positive abnormal returns, which provide strong evidence of 
predictable behavior of security returns.   
Lo and Mackinlay (1990) construct a particular weekly contrarian strategy.  It is to buy 
stocks at time t that were losers at time t-k and to sell stocks at time t that were winners at time t-
k, where winning and losing is determined with respect to the equal-weighted return on the 
market.  Thus, the weight for security i at time t is,  
	 	 	 1, … ,                                                         
where ∑  is the equal-weighted market index.  By construction, 
, …	  is an arbitrage portfolio because the weights sum to zero.  Since the 
portfolio weights are proportional to the differences between the market index and the returns, 
securities that deviate more positively from the market at time t-k will have greater negative 
weight in the time t portfolio and vice versa.  Such a strategy is designed to best take advantage 
of stock market overreactions.  The profit  from such a strategy is 
 	 ∑ ,  
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and take the expectation of the above equation,                                                                                       
 	 	 	 Γ 	 	∑                                             
where	 	 , ∙  denotes the trace operator, and 	is the identity vector with 
proper dimension.  
Therefore, the profit of the contrarian strategy is the summation of three terms: the first 
term is the kth-order autocovariance of the equal-weighted market index.  The second term is the 
cross-sectional average of the kth-order autocovariances of the individual securities, and the last 
term is the cross-sectional variance of the mean returns.    
In order to separate the effects of cross-autocovariances versus own-autocovariances in 
generating the expected returns from the contrarian strategy, the above expected return is further 
rearranged as,  
Γ Γ Γ     
                	 . 
 is cross-autocovariances of equal-weighted market index returns,  is the own-
autocovariances of individual stock returns.  They found weekly portfolio returns from the 
contrarian strategy are strongly positively cross-autocorrelated and over 50 percent of the 
expected profits are attributable to these cross effects.  They propose the lead-lag effect as the 
cause of the strong positive cross-autocorrelation between different stocks in the portfolio.  Lead-
lag effect occurs when a security’ return lags on a common factor.  The security with less lags on 
a common factor leads the security with more lags.  Their empirical results show that returns of 
large stocks almost always lead those of smaller stocks.  Therefore, they argue that given 
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individual security returns are generally weakly negatively autocorrelated, the positive contrarian 
profits are completely attributable to cross-effects.   
  Conrad and Kaul (1998) attempt to determine the sources of the expected profits of the 
entire class of trading strategies that are based on information contained in past returns of 
individual securities.  They utilize a single framework, which builds on the analyses in Lehmann 
(1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990), to decompose the profits of all strategies, both contrarian 
and momentum.  The expected profit of the momentum strategy is  
, 	∑ , ∑
																							   
     	  
                                                                                     
where  is the predictability-profitability index,  is the 
unconditional mean of security i for the interval {t-1, t} of length k, and 
∑ 	is the unconditional single-period mean return of the equal-weighted market 
portfolio at time t.  
 Under the assumption of mean stationarity of individual security returns, the above 
decomposition shows that total expected profits of trading strategies result from two distinct 
sources: time-series predictability in asset returns, measured by P(k), and profits due to cross-
sectional dispersion in mean returns of securities, denoted by .  The first term in P(k), 
i.e. , is the average first-order autocovariance of the return on the equal-weighted market 
portfolio, the second term, i.e., , is the average first-order autocovariances of the individual 
securities in the portfolio.  This arrangement of expected returns separates the returns from the 
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time-series predictability entirely from the cross-sectional dispersion, no matter whether the 
time-series predictability is from own or cross-autocovariances,  
The empirical decomposition of the profits from the strategies suggests that the cross-
sectional variance of mean returns is both the predominant source of momentum strategy profits, 
and a major source of losses to long-term contrarian strategy.  
  However, Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) argue that the Conrad and Kaul (1998) results 
are subject to small sample biases in their tests and bootstrap experiments.  Jegadeesh and 
Titman’s empirical tests indicate that cross-sectional differences in expected returns explain very 
little, if any, of the momentum profits.  Conrad and Kaul use the average realized return of each 
stock as their measure of the stock expected return.  Specifically, ∑ , , where  is the 
number of observations available for stock i.  They use the cross-sectional variance of  as the 
estimator of	 .  Jegadeesh and Titman argue that such design ignores the impact of the error in 
the estimates of  on the estimate of .  Let , where  represents estimation error.  
Since  is an unbiased estimator of expected returns,	 0.  However, since , 
the variance of the estimated expected returns overestimates the cross-sectional variance of true 
expected returns.  They argue that the magnitude of this overestimation is exacerbated when use 
all stocks in the sample period as in Conrad and Kaul, for the calculation of expected returns, 
regardless of the length of their return history. 
 
2.2b Different Explanations 
 
There are two conflicting schools of explanations for the sources of momentum abnormal 
returns.  The dominant group consists of the behavioral theories, which challenge the market 
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efficiency hypothesis and the classical models of rational pricing.   The other group includes the 
rational theories, which argue that it is premature to reject the rational models and suggest that 
the profitability of momentum strategies may be compensation for extra risk or macroeconomic 
factors (Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)).  The market friction explanation is the third group that 
stands in the middle of the above two explanations.  
 
2.2b (1) Behavioral Explanations 
 
The explanations offered by the behavioral theories can be categorized as overreaction 
and underreaction.   DeBondt and Thaler (1985) introduce experimental psychology into the 
study of finance.  They argue that people tend to “overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news 
events.  If stock prices overshoot systematically, then they will have predictable reversals based 
on the past return data only in the long term.  This hypothesis suggests a violation of the weak-
form market efficiency.  Delong et al. (1990) states that there are rational speculators and 
liquidity or noise traders.  Because the latter buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall, the 
rational speculators would buy/sell ahead of the noise traders in the hope of selling/buy at a 
higher/lower price later.  But these purchases by rational speculators can make positive feedback 
traders even more excited and so move prices even further away from fundamental values than 
they would go in the absence of rational speculators.  
More recently, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) develop a theory based on 
investors’ overconfidence in their private information signal, rather than the public information 
signal.  This asymmetric confidence results from biased self-attribution of different investment 
outcomes.   Investors tend to attribute the performance of ex post winners to their stock selection 
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skills and that of the ex post losers to bad luck.  When an investor receives public confirmation, 
his confidence rises.  But disconfirming public information causes confidence to fall only 
modestly, if at all.   Thus, stock prices overreact to private information signals and underreact to 
public signals.  Even if an individual begins with unbiased beliefs, new public signals on average 
are viewed as confirming the private signal.  This suggests that public information can trigger 
further overreaction to a preceding private signal.  The continuing overreaction causes 
momentum in security prices, but such momentum is eventually reversed as further public 
information gradually draws the price back toward fundamentals.  This is consistent with the 
intermediate momentum and long-term reversal in stock returns.  
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) both proposed 
“underreaction”, though with a different working mechanism, to explain the intermediate 
momentum and long-term reversal.  BSV (1998) propose two psychological phenomena, 
“conservatism” and “representativeness heuristic”, to construct a parsimonious model of investor 
sentiment that at the same time, explains underreaction and overreaction as the causes for the 
momentum and the long-term contrarian abnormal returns.  Conservatism is defined as the slow 
updating of models in the face of new evidence (Edwards, 1968).  Representativeness heuristic is 
a tendency of experimental subjects to view events as typical or representative of some specific 
behavioral class when a series of such events happen recently.  Therefore, investors tend to show 
underreaction of stock prices to good news such as earnings announcements, but overreaction of 
stock prices to consistent patterns of good or bad news.  They argue that although conservatism 
alone leads to underreaction and hence to intermediate momentum, the combination of 
conservatism and representative heuristic can lead to long horizon negative returns for stocks 
with consistently high returns in the past.   
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HS (1999) does not apply any behavior biases on the part of investors, but they model a 
market with two groups of boundedly rational agents: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders”.  
They both act rationally in updating their expectations, but only conditional on their own 
information sets, or the subset of the available public information.  Each newswatcher observes 
some private information, but ignores information in the past history of prices and failes to 
extract other newswatchers’ information from prices.   Therefore, assuming information diffuses 
gradually across the population, information obtained by the informed newswatchers would be 
transmitted with a delay and prices undrreact in the short run.  This underreaction results in the 
momentum profit that momentum traders can obtain by trend-chasing.  The momentum traders 
make judgments only by a limited history of prices and do not factor in fundamental information.  
So the momentum traders tend to extrapolate based on past prices and push prices of past 
winners above their fundamental values.  In the long horizon, prices eventually revert to their 
fundamentals.  This causes long-term reversal. 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) test the gradual-information-diffusion model of HS (1999) 
empirically.  They found that firm-specific information, especially negative information, diffuses 
only gradually among the investors.  Their findings are: 1) excluding the very small stocks below 
the 20th NYSE/AMEX percentile, the profitability of the momentum strategies declines sharply 
with firm size; 2) holding size fixed, stocks with low analyst coverage generates more 
momentum returns; 3) the effect of analyst coverage is asymmetric, i.e., it is greater for stocks 
that are past losers than for past winners.  They reason this asymmetry as, for low-coverage 
stocks, when firms get good news; the managers probably have the incentive to push this good 
news to the investing public as soon as possible.  In contrast, when there is bad news, managers 
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are likely to be less forthcoming, and combining with low outside analyst coverage, the stock 
prices tend to be overpriced more.   
In their paper, the analyst coverage is a proxy for the information diffusion speed.  Thus, 
they assume that stocks with lower analyst coverage should, all else being equal, be the ones 
where firm-specific information diffuse slower across the investing public.  However, analyst 
coverage is strongly related to firm size, and the latter also captures a good portion of the 
information diffusion effect.  In order to investigate the unique role played by the analyst 
coverage in the rate of information diffusion, they calculate residual analyst coverage, where the 
residual comes from a regression of log (1+coverage) on log (firm size) and NASDAQ dummy.    
 
2.2b (2) Rational Explanations 
 
On the rational theories side, some financial economists have suggested that cross-
sectional variation in expected returns generates the momentum abnormal returns.    
Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) develop a theoretical model where the cross-sectional 
variation in risk and expected return generates profits in short-term reversal and intermediate 
momentum.  They construct a dynamic model that relates changes of a firm’s systematic risk 
through time to firm-specific variables and hence the cross-sectional variation of expected return 
to explain the abnormal returns from trading strategies.  Firm-specific variables refer to book to 
market ratio, size or past return, which are generally used to explain the cross-sectional variation 
in expected returns.   
Firms in the model have two kinds of assets: (a) in-place assets and (b) growth options.  
The sum of these types of assets yields the expected returns of firms.  In each period, cash flows 
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from in-place assets may die off, and new investment opportunities may emerge to the firm. 
Because the composition and systematic risk of the firm’s assets are persistent, expected returns 
in a given period are positively related to lagged expected returns (positive time series between 
expected returns of different periods).  However, the expected returns are negatively related to 
lagged realized returns (negative cross-sectional variation of expected returns) because shocks to 
the composition of the firm’s assets are negatively correlated with changes in systematic risk.  
Therefore, these lead to momentum effects in the intermediate term and reversal in the short term.  
At an aggregate level, the time series of portfolio expected returns show positive correlation with 
book-to-market, which serves as the firm’s risk, relative to the scale of its asset base; however, 
the excess returns are negatively related to interest rates. 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show that profits from the momentum strategy can be 
explained by a set of lagged macroeconomic variables that are related to the business cycle.  
Payoffs to a six-month/six-month momentum strategy disappear once stock returns are adjusted 
for their predictability based on these macroeconomic variables.  Thus the results provide a 
possible role for time-varying expected returns, predicted by standard macroeconomic variables, 
as an explanation for the momentum abnormal returns.  The macroeconomic variables used in 
the study are dividend yield, default spread, yield on three-month T-bills, and term structure 
spread.  Their results suggest that the profitability of momentum payoffs comes from the cross-
sectional variation in conditional expected returns.  These findings are consistent with the 
arguments of Berk et al. (1999) that profitability of momentum strategies represents 





2.2b (3) Market Friction Explanations 
Most of above papers have not taken the huge transaction costs into consideration.  
Neither do empirical studies include the transaction costs when testing the abnormal returns from 
trading strategies.  The work of Korajazyk and Sadka (2004) is one of the few papers that focus 
on the transactions costs in momentum strategy.  They find that momentum strategies remain 
profitable even after considering market frictions.  The price impact models imply that abnormal 
returns to portfolio strategies decline with portfolio size.  In particular, they estimate the size of a 
momentum-based fund that could be achieved before abnormal returns are either statistically 
insignificant or driven to zero.  They find that the estimated excess returns of some momentum 
strategies disappear after an initial investment of $4.5 to over $5.0 billion is engaged in such 
strategies.  However, additional costs involved in short sales are not fully captured by their 
measure of price impact.  
 
III. Decomposition of Momentum Returns 
 
3.1. Theoretical Model 
 
 To elucidate the relative role of the cross-sectional and time-series effects in generating 
momentum returns, we decompose the momentum expected returns first and then discuss their 
profitability under different return generating processes.   
Following Lehmann (1990) and Lo and Mackinlay (1990), we also use a weighted 
relative strength strategy (WRSS) to decompose the returns from the momentum strategy.  
However, instead of taking all the stocks with returns higher than the market return as winners 
and all the stocks with returns lower than market returns as losers, our strategy will follow the 
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typical momentum strategy that only includes top and bottom percentage stocks as winners and 
losers.   
We consider a collection of N securities and denote their period t returns  a 1 
vector , ⋯ , .  Following Lo and Mackinlay (1990), in this section, we offer the following 
assumption:  
Assumption 1:  follows a jointly covariance-stationary stochastic process with expected value 
	 	 ≡ , , ⋯  and autocovariance matrices
Γ , where 0,	sinceΓ Γ .  
 Specifically, the momentum strategy buys winners and sells losers at time	  based on 
their performance from time period 1, , where k is the length of the time interval 1, .  
The winning and losing outcomes are determined with respect to the equal-weighted return on 
the entire market.  Then, we first rank the stocks in descending order by their geometric mean 
returns over the 1,  period, i.e., ⋯ ⋯ , where S is the top or bottom 
percentage of stocks, where 0 .  Hence, top SN stocks are winners and bottom SN stocks 
are losers.  More formally, we allow 	  to denote the fraction of the trading strategy 
portfolio devoted to security i at time t, that is  
 	
																											 	 1,2,… ,
0																																																								 	 1, … ,
													 	 1, … ,
	     (1) 
where 0, 0 are parameters of the weights of the winner and loser portfolios,  is 
the geometric mean return of security i  at time interval 1, ,  
∑
 is the 
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return of equal-weighted portfolio of all securities at time interval 1, , and k is the length 
of the time interval 1, .	 
 The weighting mechanism reflects the belief of an investor that price has continuations, 
and the success of this strategy is based solely on the time-series behavior of stock prices.  This 
weighting mechanism permits us to decompose the returns of momentum strategy into time-
series and cross-sectional variations.   It also permits us to determine the relative importance of 
these components in predicting momentum returns and answer the frequently argued question of 
whether the market is efficient or whether the stock prices have memory.  More importantly, 
securities that deviate more positively (negatively) from the market mean at time period 
1,  will have greater positive (negative) weight in the time t portfolio.  Considering only the top 
and bottom S percentages of stocks in our momentum strategy, rather than all stocks, better 
represents the belief in stock price continuations, because the strongest winners probably have 
more momentum to continue winning and the worst losers probably have more momentum to 
continue losing over an intermediate period.   
 The returns from such a strategy are simply 
 		 ∑ .                                                                          (2) 
Plugging the weight function (1) into (2) and taking expectations yields the following: 	           
Γ Γ ∑ ∑  
            								 .                                                                            (3) 
where tr(ּ) denotes the trace operator,  Γ  represents the autocovariance matrices for the loser 
portfolio, and Γ  represents the autocovariance matrices for the winner portfolio1.		
                                                 
1 The derivation of Equation (3) is included in Appendix 1.  
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∑  is the average return of the winner portfolio at time t, ∑  is the 
average return of the loser portfolio at time t.  
 	 1 ,             (4) 
where	
∑
 is the average expected return of the winner portfolio,	
∑
, is the 
average expected return of the nonwinner portfolio, Γ  represents the autocovariance matrices 
for the interaction of past nonwinners and winners, and  is the identity of corresponding 
dimension, for example, Γ ∑Γ . 2 
 Similarly, 	
̅
1 ̅ 																(5) 
where 
∑
 is the average expected return of the loser portfolio, ̅
∑
, is the 
average expected return of the nonloser portfolio, and Γ ̅ represents the autocovariance matrices 
for the interaction of past nonlosers and losers.   
 Combining Equation (3)-(5), we get3:  
	 Γ Γ ∑ ∑          
     				 1
̅
1 ̅                  
     	 Γ Γ
̅
 
         1 1 1 ̅               (6) 
The first two terms in Equation (6) are the cross-sectional averages of the weighted first-
order time-series variance of the individual stock returns in the winner and loser portfolios, 
                                                 
2 The derivation of Equation (4) is included in Appendix 2. 
3 The derivation of Equation (6) is included in Appendix 3.  
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respectively.  If the market is efficient, then these two terms should equal zero.  The third and 
fourth terms are the average first-order autocovariance between two stocks involving a winner or 
loser stock and another stock.  If the stocks have a lead lag structure, in that the larger firm leads 
the smaller firm in responding to a specific common factor risk but in the same direction, then 
the cross-autocovariance is positive.  The fifth and sixth terms are cross-sectional variances of 
the mean returns in the winner and loser portfolios.  The size of the fifth and sixth terms 
increases with increased variation of the mean returns in the winner and loser portfolio.  The rest 
of the terms are the summation of weighted products of expected returns.  The fifth to ninth 
terms are independent of the autocovariances, Γ .  To measure the role of the own-
autocovariances, cross-autocovariances, and cross-sectional variances separately, we further 
arrange the terms in Equation (6) so that we decompose the expected momentum returns into 
different parts indicated above:  
	 1 –            
															 1 Γ Γ ̅ 1 1  
																							 1 ̅ 																			                                                           
    	 Γ ̅  
																 	 1 Γ 	 1 Γ 	 1  
																					 1 1 ̅                                             
We define	 Γ ̅ , which is the 
cross-autocovariance of individual stock returns,	 1 Γ 1 Γ , 
is the own-autocovariance of individual stock returns, and 	 , is the 
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cross-sectional variance of mean returns in the winner and loser portfolios.  Thus, the expected 
returns of the momentum strategy could be written as  
	 	 1 1 1 ̅     (7)       
By deduction4, we get 
1 1 1 ̅ .  (8)                         
Let .  Therefore,  
	  
               	 	 .                                                                            (9) 
 Equation (9) shows clearly that the expected momentum returns could be decomposed 
into four parts: a)  is dependent on only off-diagonals of the autocovariance matrixΓ , which is 
the correlation between returns of two different stocks from two different time periods; b)	  is 
dependent on only the diagonals of autocovariance matrixΓ , which is the correlation of own 
stock returns from two different time periods; c)  is independent of the autocovariance matrix 
Γ , which is the cross-sectional variances of the mean returns in the winner and loser portfolios 
for a given time period; and d)  is also independent of the autocovraiance matrix Γ , which is 
the weighted product of winner portfolio mean return and its deviation from the mean return of 
the whole portfolio plus the similar weighted product from the loser portfolio.   
 Equation (9) also indicates the scenarios in which the expected returns from the 
momentum strategy become positive.  Since , ,  are positive,  is always positive.  The total 
number of stocks is greater than 1, so if the summation of the own-autocovariances of the stock 
returns in the winner and loser portfolios is positive, then  is positive.  However, the link 
                                                 
4 The derivation of Equation (8) is included in Appendix 4. 
28 
 
between the sign of	  and stock return momentum is unclear.  According to the definition of 
own-autocovariance, , when stock returns at time 	and 
1are both greater or smaller than their mean, 	  is positive.  Therefore, if  is positive, we 
cannot conclude that there is stock return momentum.  For example, assume a past winner’s 
mean return is 15%.  Its stock return at time 1 is 10%, and decreases to 5% at time 	. 
Therefore, its own-autocovariance is positive, even though the return of this winner stock 
declined in the current period.  Similarly, if   is negative, we cannot conclude that there is 
return reversal.  Stock return momentum is also possible when  is negative.  For instance, 
assume a past winner’s mean return is still 15%.  Its stock return increases from 10% to 30% at 
time . In this case,  is negative, but clearly, there is stock return momentum.  To summarize, 
the sign of  cannot clearly indicate stock return momentum or reversal.  However, if it is 
significantly different from zero, it indicates that stock returns are serially correlated, but with 
stock return pattern undetermined.  Furthermore, the profitability of momentum strategy does not 
require stock return momentum.  Of course, if there is return momentum, momentum strategy is 
more profitable.  However, what is required in the momentum strategy is the stable relative 
ranking of the stocks.  If past winners remain winners in the next period, even if their stock 
returns drop, or past losers stay as losers, even if their stock returns increase, the momentum 
strategy works.  Therefore, the momentum strategy relies on the return predictability belief: 
winners continue to be winners and losers continue to be losers.  The stock return momentum or 
reversal is not specified.  If the correlations of two different stocks from two different times are 
positive, then  is negative.  	is positive if the expected return of the winner portfolio is 
positive and higher than the   market expected return, and simultaneously, the expected return of 
the loser portfolio is below zero and lower than the market expected return.   
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3.2. Circumstance in Generating Positive Momentum Returns 
 
We further investigate a return generating process that can result in a positive return from 
the momentum strategy.   
3.2a Returns follow random walk with starting point  
 
 Similar to Conrad and Kaul (1998), we allow returns  to follow a random walk with 
starting point , which was calculated as  ,	where  is white noise or is 
independently and identically distributed with 0 mean and constant variance.  Thus, the stock 
returns 	are serially independent.  Now,  we further assume the returns of different stocks are 
independent between different time periods.  Therefore, Γ  or both  and  are zero; hence, the 
momentum return can be written as  
 	        (10) 
  is always positive, if  is positive.  Thus, even though the stock returns do not have cross-
sectional or serial dependence, the momentum strategy can still generate positive returns.  
However, these positive returns do not come from the stock return predictability or stock price 
momentum.   When the expected returns of the winner portfolio are positive and those of the 
loser portfolio are negative, the momentum strategy generates increasingly large returns as the 
winners win more and   the losers lose more.  In this scenario, even though the stock returns 
follow random walk or the financial market is efficient, the momentum strategy can still generate 
positive returns.  Therefore, even if the returns from the momentum strategy are positive, we 
cannot directly conclude that they can be attributed to the stock price momentum.  Under the 
above analysis of the return generating process we observe that the momentum returns are 
determined by the sign and magnitude of the four components.  We could not verify the stock 
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return predictability that winners continue to win and losers continue to lose simply from the fact 
that momentum returns are positive.  Furthermore, we could not deny any stock return 
predictability if the momentum returns are negative.  In the literature, both Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990) and Conrad and Kaul (1998) concluded under the random walk model that the momentum 
strategy could generate profits equal to the cross-sectional variance in mean returns of individual 
securities, , even if stock returns are completely unpredictable.  Similarly, zero or negative 
momentum returns do not imply zero autocovarance automatically.  The only method to 
determining the possibility of stock return predictability is to decompose the momentum returns 
and empirically measure their component magnitudes directly.  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
  
4.1. An Empirical Appraisal of Momentum Returns 
 
  To measure the relative importance of stock price predictability in generating returns 
from the momentum strategy that we developed in Section III, we empirically decompose the 
momentum returns into four parts: average cross-autocovariances ( , average own-
autocovariances ( , cross-sectional variances of the expected returns in the winner and loser 
portfolios ( , and the expected returns of the winner and loser portfolios ( .  By 
investigating the composition of historical momentum returns directly, we reveal the sources and 
their relative importance in constituting the momentum returns.  All the stocks listed in the 
NYSE & Amex, and Nasdaq markets are included in the study.  The entire dataset includes over 
27,000 stocks that have been traded in the U.S. stock market over the past 44-years period, from 
January 1965 to December 2009.   The data on stock returns were collected from the Center for 
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Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stock File for NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks.   
Because the trading environments in NYSE and NASDAQ markets are different, stocks in 
NYSE and Nasdaq markets are also investigated separately to evaluate the influence from market 
differences.  
 
4.1a Return decomposition 
 
To find a potential pattern between the length of the ranking period k and the resulting 
component weights, different ranking periods k equal to 3, 6, 9, and 12 months are examined 
separately.  The default weight parameters for the winner and loser portfolios are set to equal 1 
( 1  in Equation (1).  In addition, two types of momentum strategies are investigated 
empirically.  One is the rolling strategy, which is very similar to the most frequently investigated 
momentum strategy.  This strategy includes overlapping holding periods.  In any given month t, 
the strategy holds a series of portfolios that are selected in the current month as well as in the 
previous k months if there are no skip months.  The other strategy has no overlapping holding 
periods, and it was used in the Lo and Mackinlay (1990) paper.   
As the entire time span of 44 years is a rather long time period, four 10-year periods are 
investigated separately to capture any potential change in the market environment.  Before 1995, 
there were invisibly small amounts of short-selling activities in the U. S. market.  Because short 
sales have been argued as a necessity in correcting overpriced assets, the short-selling level can 
potentially affect momentum returns from the loser portfolio.   It is also well known that in the 
2005, to gather data and study thoroughly the effect of the uptick rule on market volatility, price 
efficiency and liquidity, the SEC implemented a Pilot Program from May 2, 2005 to July 3, 2007.  
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This Pilot Program suspended the uptick rule5 on one-third of Russell 3000 Index constituent 
stocks with high levels of liquidity.  On July 3, 2007, the SEC finally abolished Rule 10a-1 and 
any rule of exchanges, including NASDAQ 3350, which applied a bid test on short sales (Bai, 
2007).   Therefore, this Pilot Program and the abolition of these price tests may improve the 
trading environment for short sales, which makes the correction of stock overpricing easier and 
hence affects the momentum returns from the loser portfolio.   Therefore, years 1994 and 2004 
were set as two cut-off points for the 10 year sub periods.  
Table 1 demonstrates both the magnitudes and weights of the four components in the 
momentum returns.   depends only on cross-autocovariances in which one stock’s return may 
be correlated to another stock’s return in the previous period.   depends only on own- 
autocovariances, which is also interpreted as stock price predictability.   is the cross-sectional 
variation of the expected returns in the winner and loser portfolios for a given time.   depends 
on the expected returns in the winner and loser portfolios.  Of these four components, only   
directly challenges the efficient market hypothesis that states that stock price has no memory.  In 
our empirical testing, the expected returns of the stocks are estimated using the average returns 
over the entire time span.  Because it is less likely that the expected stock returns remain the 
same over the entire 44-year time span, investigating shorter time periods, such as 10 years, 
becomes very meaningful.  Because the momentum returns are time-series, all of the t tests are 
adjusted for potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by using the method of Kiefer and 
Bogelsang (2002).   
                                                 
5 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had Rule 10a-1 under the Security Exchange Act of 1934, which 
provided that investors must sell short a listed stock either at a price above the preceding sale price, known as the 
plus tick or at the last sale price if it was higher than the last different price, known as the zero plus tick. Similarly, 
NASDAQ Rule 3350 provided that short sales in NASDAQ stocks be either higher or at the best bid when the best 
bid was below the preceding best bid (Bai, 2007) 
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 Table 1 shows that for rolling momentum strategies, the major determinant of the 
momentum return is , the autocorrelation of own stock returns.  This measure is significant 
most of the time at the 10 percent level and determines momentum returns to a great extent.  In 
comparison to	 , two different stocks’ correlation between two different times, , constitutes a 
very small amount in the momentum returns and are much less frequently significant at the 10 
percent level.  Furthermore, the consistently negative sign of  shows that the trace of Γ  in 
Equation (28) is negative6.  As analyzed in the previous section, the negative own stock return 
autocorrelation does not specify whether the stock returns show a momentum or reversal pattern.  
However, given the magnitude and significance of	 , it is an important determinant of returns 
from the momentum strategy.  More interestingly, the magnitude of	 	decreases as the ranking 
period k moves further away for all subperiods and the entire time span in the rolling strategy.  
This pattern is logical..  Stock return predictability suggesting that winners continue to be 
winners and losers continue to be losers should weaken as the reference point of time becomes 
more remote.  Such pattern is not observed in the other three components.  The second most 
significant component is , the cross-sectional variance of expected returns in the winner and 
loser portfolios at a given time.  Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggested that cross-sectional variance 
of expected returns was the main contributor to the momentum returns.  However, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1999) argue that the large magnitude of	  in Conrad and Kaul (1998) is due to the 
measurement error of expected returns.  	 	is significant most of the times; however, its weight 
is much smaller than  and .  Berk, Green and Naik (1999) argue that 	is the main 
                                                 
6 Conrad and Kaul (1998) decompose the expected returns from the momentum strategy.  They denote the 
summation of  and 	  as 	 .  The empirical results of 	  show that 	   is consistently negative.  However, we 
cannot know the sign of  and 	  individually from their paper.  So we do not know whether they get negative 
	 too as we do. 
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contributor of the momentum returns.  They explain that change of a firm’s systematic risk 
causes the change of firm-specific variables and thus the cross-sectional variation of expected 
return.   
The sub-time periods all demonstrate similar patterns.  However, the components are 
more frequently significant and at a higher significant level in recent years.  In the second sub-
time period from year 1965 to year 1974, none of the components was significant.  It should be a 
volatile market period during which the stock returns had minimal connections.  The nonrolling 
strategy demonstrates similar results, albeit at lower levels of significance.  In the nonrolling 
strategy, both  and  are the two most important components in terms of their weights in the 
momentum returns.  As observed for the rolling strategy,  is significant most of the time, albeit 
with a much smaller weight.  To summarize, the data in Table I indicates that stock returns do 
have memory to some extent, and taking advantage of this phenomenon can generate profits.  
This does challenge the market efficiency hypothesis to some extent.   In addition, cross-
sectional variance of expected returns in the winner and loser portfolios is another important 
source of momentum returns.  
 It is often observed in the momentum literature that when Nasdaq stocks are included in 
the portfolio, the returns of the momentum strategy decrease dramatically.  Table 2 decomposes 
momentum returns for NYSE & AMEX stocks only to take advantage of market differences.  
Both rolling and nonrolling strategies are investigated for the entire time span from 1965 to 2009 
and for different ranking periods k.   Similar patterns are observed as those in Table 1.   and  
are the two most important sources for the returns from the momentum strategy and are 
significant for most of the cases.  The magnitude of  decreases as the ranking period moves 
remote.   is significant most of times but with a much smaller weight.  In the nonrolling 
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strategy,  and 	remain the two most important sources of the momentum returns.  However, 
 is not significant at the 10 percent level.   
 Additionally, a few recent papers noted the following: (1) the proportional contributions 
of the winner and the loser portfolios to the momentum abnormal returns are indeed asymmetric 
(Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000, Lesmond, Schill and Zhou, 2004); and (2) the characteristics of the 
loser firms are quite unique.  Unlike the winners, the stocks that generate the bulk of the 
momentum abnormal returns are the “losers” that can be characterized as small, low-price, high-
beta, off-NYSE stocks.  Those stocks are typically hard to sell short and involve high trading 
costs (Lesmond, Schill and Zhou, 2004).  To investigate the different influences of the winner 
and loser portfolios on the momentum returns, we also change the weight parameters  or   for 
winner and loser portfolios individually to examine their different effects on the sources of 
momentum returns.  Table 3 presents the magnitudes and weights of the four components by 
increasing the weight of winner or loser portfolio monotonically while keeping the weight of the 
other portfolio constant.  To investigate only the effects from the different weights of the winner 
and loser portfolios, the ranking period k is fixed at six.  Specifically, the rolling momentum 
strategy (6,0,1) is used in the analysis from January 1965 to December 2009 for NYSE & AMEX 
stocks only.  Panel A shows the results with increasing weights for the loser portfolio from = 1 
to 10 or 50 while keeping the winner portfolio weight constant.  The relative contributions of the 
components to the momentum returns remain in proportion when the weight of the loser 
portfolio increases.  This indicates that the magnitude of the average own-autocovariance of the 
winner portfolio in the holding period is negligible compared to that of the loser portfolio.  Both 
the own-autocovariances in the winner and loser portfolios took on a negative sign (data not 
shown).  However, the magnitude of the winner portfolio is about 20-fold smaller than that of the 
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loser portfolio.  This phenomenon is observed in all the four ranking periods.  For example, at 
k=6, the average own-autocovariances of the winner and loser portfolios are −0.00009765 and 
0.0020, respectively.  Therefore, the returns of the winner portfolio stocks are much more 
random than that of the loser portfolio stocks and thus have a much weaker pattern to track over 
time.  In Panel B, the winner portfolio weight is increased while keeping the loser portfolio 
weight constant.  The magnitude of own-autocovariance does not change substantially.  Hence, 
winners’ return pattern is much less related over time or is more random than the loser portfolio.  
Conversely, the loser portfolio has stronger return patterns in terms of own stock autocovariance.  
These results obtained from the expected return decomposition clearly provide an underlying 
explanation to the recent finding that the loser rather than the winner portfolio is the major 
contributor to momentum returns.  Therefore, to buy long and take advantage of the return 
pattern from the winner portfolio is much less reliable than selling short and exploiting the much 
stronger return predictability in the loser portfolio.   
 
4.1b Empirical comparison of our model and the model in Lo and MacKinlay (1990) 
 
The key difference between our model and the Lo & MacKinlay (1990) model is the 
weighting scheme.  Our momentum strategy includes only the top winners and bottom losers; 
however, Lo & MacKinlay (1990) included all of the stocks in their portfolio.  According to our 
weighting scheme, our momentum strategy places more weight on the potential stronger stock 
return patterns because the top winners and bottom losers have a stronger tendency to maintain 
their return patterns in the next period.  Without including the intermediate portfolio stocks, our 
momentum strategy reduces the noise in the stock return patterns from the middle group stocks.  
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Table 4 illustrates the empirical decomposition for the Lo & MacKinlay (1990) weighting 
scheme.  Both the rolling and nonrolling momentum strategies with different ranking periods k 
are attempted for stocks listed in the NYSE & AMEX indices over the 44-year time span from 
1965 to 2009.  The key difference in the empirical results of the momentum strategy of Lo & 
MacKinlay (1990) and our momentum strategy is that the average autocorrelation of own stock 
returns  becomes much less important in explaining the momentum returns.  Furthermore, it is 
less frequently significant at the 10 percent level.  This phenomenon can be explained by the 
different weighting schemes.  The top winners and bottom losers have a stronger tendency to 
continue the current return patterns; therefore, by including only those top and bottom 




 Momentum strategies that take advantage of potential return predictability have puzzled 
finance researchers in the past twenty years.  Heated dispute about whether the market is 
efficient makes this topic even more attractive.  Instead of trying to identify unknown risk factors 
or behavioral theories that can fully explain momentum returns, our study attempts to decompose 
the momentum returns directly and use historical data to discover the sources of the momentum 
returns and their relative importance in generating the momentum returns.   
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) proposed that the positive cross-autocovariance or the lead-lag 
structure, rather than the small magnitude of the negative autocorrelation, drives the positive 
contrarian portfolio returns.  Conrad and Kaul (1998) further found in their return decomposition 
that the positive cross-sectional variance in mean returns is responsible for the profitability of the 
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momentum strategy.  However, Lehmann (1990) and Jegadeesh (1990) argued that the first-order 
serial correlation in stock returns is the major contributor to the contrarian returns.  
Our empirical results demonstrate that autocorrelation of own stock returns is one of the 
driving forces for the momentum expected returns.  The magnitude of the own-autocorrelation 
decreases as the ranking period becomes more remote.  The second important source comes from 
the cross-sectional variance of the mean return in the winner and loser portfolios at a given time.  
The third important source is the difference in the expected returns between the winner and loser 
portfolios.  To our surprise, the cross-autocovariance does not contribute much to the momentum 
expected returns.  Thus, the lead-lag effect can generate momentum returns, but its effect is not 
as significant as we previously thought.   
Furthermore, by changing the weights of the winner and loser portfolios, we find that the 
return pattern of the winner portfolio is much weaker than that of the loser portfolio.  On the 
contrary, the loser portfolio retains a much stronger return pattern from the ranking period to the 
holding period.   This provides further evidence to explain the recent finding that the loser 
portfolio is the major contributor to the momentum returns.  Therefore, the market may not be as 
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Table 1. Return Decomposition with All Stocks in the U.S. Market 
Decomposition of monthly returns from momentum strategies with a sample of all stocks in the 
NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq from January 1965 to December 2009.  To capture the possible 
change of expected returns over the whole 44 years and to take into account of the potential 
change of trading environment, 10 year subperiods are also investigated.  Panel A lists the 
magnitudes and weights of the four components and the size of the expected momentum returns 
for the rolling momentum strategy.  Panel B lists the results for nonrolling momentum strategy.  
Different ranking periods (k) are examined with k=3, 6, 9, 12 months respectively.  The default 
weight parameters for the winner and loser portfolios are 1.  The table reports t-
statistics in parentheses, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and 
Bogelsang (2002) approach.  Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by a, b and 
c, respectively. 
Lag(k)               	       							         	      % 									% 		 %      %  
Panel A: Rolling strategy with winners and losers scheme  
a)1965~~2009  
 3        -0.0001    -0.0053     0.0012      0.0001      -0.0042           2%       126%       -29%         -2% 
            (-0.94)     (-6.93)a     (5.99)b      (9.42)a      (-8.72)a       
 6         0.0002    -0.0038     0.0012      0.0001      -0.0027          -7%       141%       -44%         -4% 
            (1.23)      (-4.64)c     (5.99)b     (14.01)a     (-5.14)b 
 9         0.0004    -0.0034     0.0013      0.0001      -0.0015        -27%       227%       -87%          7% 
            (4.28)c     (-5.09)b     (5.96)b     (10.10)a      (-4.34)c 
12        0.0003    -0.0027     0.0013      0.0001      -0.0010        -30%       270%     -130%       -10% 
            (2.12)      (-3.87)      (6.01)b      (8.35)a       (-2.83) 
b)1965-1974 
 3        -0.0001    -0.0024     0.0009     0.0005      -0.0011           9%       218%        -82%        -45% 
            (-0.27)     (-1.54)      (3.67)       (2.19)       (-1.56) 
 6        -0.0002    -0.0012     0.0009     0.0006       0.0001       -200%   -1200%       900%       600%    
            (-0.93)     (-1.26)      (3.70)       (2.08)        (0.27)          
 9         0.0003    -0.0016      0.0009     0.0007       0.0003       100%      -533%       300%       233% 
            (2.08)      (-2.56)       (3.69)       (2.01)       (1.90) 
12        0.0001    -0.0012      0.0009     0.0008       0.0006           5%        -40%         30%         25% 
            (1.04)      (-1.97)       (3.79)c      (1.98)       (3.61) 
c)1975-1984 
 3         0.0001    -0.0071      0.0015    0.0003       -0.0052       -17%       137%        -29%          -6% 
            (0.13)      (-4.56)c      (4.88)b    (3.23)        (-4.29)c 
 6         0.0005    -0.0045      0.0016    0.0004       -0.0021       -24%       214%        -76%        -19% 
            (-0.01)     (-5.18)b     (4.59)b    (5.85)b        (-3.14) 
 9         0.0007    -0.0039      0.0016    0.0005       -0.0011       -64%       355%      -145%        -45% 
            (1.07)      (-3.18)      (4.90)b     (6.11)a        (-1.52) 
12        0.0005    -0.0030      0.0016    0.0006       -0.0003     -167%     1000%      -533%      -200% 







Table 1. (continued) 
Lag(k)               	       							         	      % 									% 		 %      %  
d)1985-1994 
 3        -0.0001    -0.0089     0.0023     0.0002      -0.0065           2%       137%        -35%          -3% 
            (-1.40)    (-17.81)a    (7.63)a     (6.69)a       (-8.64)a 
 6         0.0004    -0.0069     0.0024     0.0003       -0.0037       -11%        186%       -65%          -8% 
            (4.30)c    (-10.40)a    (7.87)a     (7.94)a       (-4.29)c 
 9         0.0007    -0.0061     0.0024     0.0004       -0.0026       -27%         235%        -92%         -7% 
            (5.32)b    (-10.80)a    (8.28)a     (9.21)a       (-3.22) 
12        0.0003    -0.0047     0.0024     0.0004       -0.0015        -20%         313%      -160%        -27% 
            (2.90)     (-13.43)a    (7.68)a     (8.70)a        (-2.53) 
e)1995-2004 
 3         0.0009    -0.0092      0.0028     0.0002       -0.0053       -17%         174%        -53%        -4% 
             (2.46)     (-8.14)a      (6.98)a     (12.10)a      (-6.30)a 
 6         0.0010    -0.0069      0.0029     0.0003       -0.0026        -38%         265%        -112%     -12% 
            (4.66)c     (-10.99)a    (7.33)a    (22.19)a      (-5.21)b 
 9         0.0008    -0.0059      0.0029     0.0004       -0.0018         44%         328%        161%      22% 
            (5.63)b     (-10.92)a    (8.00)a    (23.88)a      (-2.93) 
12        0.0008    -0.0054      0.0029     0.0004       -0.0012        -67%         450%       -242%     -33% 
            (6.41)a     (-9.03)a      (8.88)a    (20.31)a      (-1.60) 
 
Panel B: Nonrolling strategy with winners and losers scheme 
a)1965~~2009  
 3        -0.0002    -0.0017     0.0011     0.0001      -0.0007          29%          243%       -157%      -14% 
            (-1.52)     (-5.52)b     (5.83)b     (8.06)a     (-2.95) 
 6        -0.0000    -0.0009     0.0012     0.0001       0.0004         -0%         -225%        300%       25% 
            (-0.29)     (-3.77)c     (5.51)b    (13.69)a    (1.93) 
 9        -0.0003    -0.0004     0.0013     0.0001       0.0007         -43%          -57%         186%       14% 
            (-2.53)     (-0.84)      (6.29)a     (15.89)a      (3.15) 
12       -0.0001    -0.0016     0.0013     0.0001      -0.0003         33%         533%     -433%       -33% 
            (-2.50)     (-2.72)      (5.26)b     (9.73)a      (-1.00) 
b)1965-1974 
 3         0.0005    -0.0015     0.0009     0.0004       0.0002          250%     -750%       450%      200% 
            (0.87)      (-1.17)      (3.81)c       (2.27)       (0.57) 
 6        -0.0001    -0.0006     0.0009     0.0004       0.0006         -17%      -100%         150%      67% 
            (-0.85)     (-1.42)      (4.13)a      (2.18)        (2.58) 
 9        -0.0001    -0.0006     0.0011     0.0008       0.0011          -9%        -55%        100%        73% 
            (-0.55)     (-0.99)      (3.35)       (1.94)        (4.76)c 
12        0.0002    -0.0010     0.0009      0.0005       0.0005          40%       -200%      180%      100% 








Table 1. (continued) 
Lag(k)               	       							         	      % 									% 		 %      %  
c)1975-1984 
 3        -0.0001    -0.0031     0.0015     0.0003      -0.0014          7%         221%       -107%      -21% 
            (-0.21)     (-1.95)      (5.23)b      (2.95)       (-1.31) 
 6         0.0007    -0.0026     0.0017     0.0004        0.0002        350%     -1300%       850%     200% 
            (0.85)      (-1.98)      (5.73)b      (4.28)c       (0.42) 
 9        -0.0002    -0.0007     0.0016     0.0005       0.0013        -15%        -54%        123%        38% 
            (-3.01)     (-2.29)      (3.90)c      (6.56)a       (5.43)b 
12       -0.0001    -0.0014     0.0020     0.0006       0.0010         -10%     -140%       200%         60% 
            (-1.10)     (-4.40)c    (6.52)a      (5.41)b       (2.39) 
d)1985-1994 
 3         0.0002    -0.0049     0.0024     0.0002      -0.0022         -9%         223%      -109%        -9% 
            (-0.21)     (-1.95)      (5.23)b      (2.95)       (-1.31) 
 6         0.0006    -0.0037     0.0025     0.0003      -0.0003       -200%       1233%    -833%     -100% 
            (2.24)      (-4.95)b     (5.35)b     (6.90)a       (-0.23)             
 9        -0.0004    -0.0009     0.0026     0.0004       0.0016         -25%        -56%       163%        25% 
            (-4.51)c    (-0.96)      (5.41)b    (10.26)a       (1.16) 
12       -0.0002    -0.0029     0.0029     0.0004       0.0002       -100%      -1450%   1450%      200% 
            (-1.31)     (-1.76)      (4.04)c    (14.04)a       (0.10) 
e)1995-2004 
 3         0.0004    -0.0034     0.0029      0.0002       0.0001        400%      -3400%   2900%      200% 
            (1.91)      (-5.83)b     (5.47)b     (12.84)a      (0.13) 
 6        -0.0006    -0.0006     0.0034      0.0003      0.0025         -24%         -24%       136%       12% 
            (-2.58)     (-1.10)      (4.38)c     (15.66)a      (3.10) 
 9        -0.0001    -0.0020     0.0037      0.0004      0.0020          -5%        -100%      185%        20% 
            (-0.32)     (-2.87)      (3.94)c     (18.52)a      (1.39) 
12       -0.0002    -0.0038     0.0044      0.0004      0.0008         -25%       -475%       550%       50% 











Table 2. Return Decomposition with NYSE & AMEX Stocks Only 
Decomposition of monthly returns from momentum strategies with stocks listed only in NYSE, 
and AMEX markets from January 1965 to December 2009.  Panel A lists the magnitudes and 
weights of the four components and the size of the expected momentum returns for the rolling 
momentum strategy.  Panel B lists the results for nonrolling momentum strategy. Different 
ranking periods (k) are examined with k=3, 6, 9, 12 months respectively.  The default weight 
parameters for the winner and loser portfolios are 1.		The table reports t-statistics in 
parentheses, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and Bogelsang 
(2002) approach.  Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by a, b and c, 
respectively. 
Lag(k)               	       							         	      % 									% 		 %      %  
Panel A: Rolling strategy with winners and losers scheme  
 3        -0.0002    -0.0031     0.0006     0.0000      -0.0026          8%        119%         -23%        -0% 
            (-2.04)     (-8.63)a     (4.31)c     (1.94)       (-10.46)a         
 6         0.0002    -0.0021     0.0007     0.0000      -0.0013         -15%       162%        -54%        -0%   
            (1.44)      (-3.98)c     (4.23)c     (4.92)b       (-4.28)c 
 9         0.0003    -0.0019     0.0007     0.0001      -0.0008          -38%      238%        -88%       -13% 
            (6.10)a     (-4.08)c     (4.22)c     (7.19)a       (-3.12) 
12        0.0002     -0.0013     0.0007     0.0001      -0.0004        -50%        325%      -175%      -25% 
            (1.68)      (-2.45)      (4.21)c     (6.95)a       (-1.34) 
 
Panel B: Nonrolling strategy with winners and losers scheme 
 3        -0.0001    -0.0009    0.0006     0.0000      -0.0004           25%        225%      -150%       -0% 
            (-0.83)     (-3.01)      (4.30)c      (1.74)      (-1.40) 
 6         0.0001    -0.0004     0.0007     0.0000       0.0004          25%        -100%       175%        0% 
            (0.51)      (-2.69)      (4.13)c      (4.59)c      (2.44) 
 9        -0.0001     0.0000     0.0007     0.0001       0.0007         -14%          0%         100%        14% 
            (-0.63)      (0.01)      (4.45)c      (6.61)a      (2.86) 
12       -0.0001    -0.0005     0.0007     0.0001      0.0002          -50%       -250%       350%       50% 












Table 3. Return Decomposition with Change of Weights 
Decomposition of monthly returns from rolling momentum strategies with stocks listed only in 
NYSE, and AMEX markets from January 1965 to December 2009.  Different combination of , 
 are examined with a fixed ranking period k=6.  Panel A lists the magnitudes and weights of the 
four components and the size of the expected momentum returns for the rolling momentum 
strategy.  Panel B lists the results for nonrolling momentum strategy.  The table reports t-
statistics in parentheses, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and 
Bogelsang (2002) approach.  Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by a, b and 
c, respectively. 
( , )    						            	       							     						                % 									% 		     		%      %  
Panel A:  Increasing loser portfolio weight with constant winner portfolio weight 
(1, 1)       0.0002    -0.0021     0.0007     0.0000      -0.0013        -15%       162%       -54%       -0%            
                (1.44)      (-3.98)c     (4.23)c    (4.92)b       (-4.28)c 
(1, 10)     0.0028    -0.0206     0.0050    -0.0001     -0.0129         -22%      160%       -39%         1% 
                (2.71)      (-3.94)c     (3.84)c    (-3.77)c      (-4.28)c 
(1, 50)     0.0144    -0.0124     0.0242    -0.0008      0.0254          57%       -49%        95%        -3% 
                (2.81)      (-3.93)c     (3.79)c    (-6.08)a      (4.26)c 
Panel B:  Increasing winner portfolio weight with constant loser portfolio weight 
(1, 1)       0.0002    -0.0021     0.0007     0.0000      -0.0013        -15%      162%       -54%        -0% 
                (1.44)      (-3.98)c     (4.23)c     (4.92)b       (-4.28)c 
(10, 1)    -0.0010    -0.0030     0.0024     0.0006      -0.0011         91%      273%      -218%     -55% 
                (-2.36)     (-3.13)     (5.28)b     (9.05)a       (-1.48) 
(50, 1)    -0.0063    -0.0069     0.0103     0.0028      -0.0001      6300%    6900%   -10300%  -2800%   














Table 4. Return Decomposition following Lo & MacKinlay (1990) 
Decomposition of monthly returns from momentum strategies with stocks listed only in NYSE, 
and AMEX markets from January 1965 to December 2009.  The weighting scheme follows the 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) paper with all the stocks included in the portfolio.  Panel A lists the 
magnitudes and weights of the four components and the size of the expected momentum returns 
for the rolling momentum strategy.  Panel B lists the results for nonrolling momentum strategy.   
Different ranking periods (k) are examined with k=3, 6, 9, 12 months respectively.  The default 
weight parameters for the winner and loser portfolios are 1.  The table reports t-
statistics in parentheses, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and 
Bogelsang (2002) approach.  Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by a, b and 
c, respectively. 
Lag(k)                        	       							   	      % 									     % 		           %       
Panel A: Rolling strategy with all stocks included  
 3              -0.0001      -0.0002      0.0002           -0.0002           50%             100%            -100%   
                  (-2.97)       (-4.15)c      (5.66)b           (-8.49)a 
 6              -0.0000      -0.0002      0.0002           -0.0001             0%             200%            -200% 
                  (-0.82)       (-2.59)       (5.55)b           (-2.66)      
 9               0.0000      -0.0002       0.0002           -0.0000           -0%            2000%          -2000%  
                  (2.76)        (-4.33)c      (5.47)b           (-0.62) 
12              0.0001      -0.0001       0.0002           0.0000          1000%         -1000%          2000% 
                  (0.32)        (-1.58)        (5.41)b           (2.03) 
Panel B: Nonrolling strategy with all stocks included 
 3              -0.0001      -0.0001      0.0002            0.0000         -1000%         -1000%          2000% 
                  (-0.72)       (-0.68)        (5.73)b           (1.29) 
 6               0.0000      -0.0001       0.0002            0.0001            0%             -100%            200% 
                   (0.68)       (-1.24)        (5.37)b           (4.81)b 
 9              -0.0000       0.0000       0.0002            0.0002           -0%                0%              100% 
                  (-0.22)       (0.19)         (5.46)b           (7.01)a 
12             -0.0000      -0.0000       0.0002            0.0001           -0%              -0%              200% 





































Appendix 1: Derivation of Equation (3) 
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Appendix 3: Derivation of Equation (6) 
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Appendix 4: Derivation of Equation (8)  
Since 
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The winner and loser portfolios of momentum strategies are sensitive to different risks.  
Short-selling can create a situation in which the loser portfolio is more profoundly affected; this 
phenomenon may explain the bulk of the momentum abnormal returns that are asymmetrically 
contributed by the loser portfolio.  The short-selling risk also provides a possible explanation for 
the finding in the first essay that the own-stock autocovariance is much more stable in the loser 
portfolio and is the major contributor to the momentum abnormal returns.  Using a pooled 
interval regression, this study first estimated the realizable shorting demand by treating the 
observed short interest data as the lower bound and the institutional ownership as a conservative 
upper bound.  The difference between the estimated realizable shorting demand and the realized 
shorting demand is our proxy for the short-selling constraints.  With this new proxy, we found 
that the short-selling constraints and risks explained the momentum abnormal returns from the 
loser portfolio strongly and independently.  Stocks that are mostly short-selling constrained 
generated the lowest returns.  This return prediction in the momentum strategy supports the 
mispricing explanation that stocks with more severe short-selling constraints prevent pessimistic 
information from quickly being released into the stock price, causing those stocks to be 
overpriced and autocorrelated in returns.  Rather than immediately dropping to the true value, 
constraints on short-selling cause the stock price to drop in a gradual fashion that is demonstrated 
as stock return autocorrelation or predictability.  We also found that the short-selling constraints 
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are a key explanation for the well-known puzzle that including NASDAQ stocks in the 
momentum strategy results in a drastic reduction in the momentum abnormal returns.  Our study 
also derives interesting inferences about the determinants of short-selling demand and lends 




   Recently a few papers have noted the following: (1) the proportional contributions of 
the winner and the loser portfolios to the momentum abnormal returns are indeed asymmetric 
(Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000, Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou, 2004); and (2) the characteristics of 
the loser firms are quite unique.  Unlike winners, the stocks that generate the bulk of the 
momentum abnormal returns are the “losers” that can be characterized as small, low-price, high-
beta, off-NYSE stocks.  Those stocks are typically hard to sell short, and involve high trading 
costs (Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou, 2004).   
 Due to the different characteristics of winner and loser portfolios, the winner and loser 
portfolios can be sensitive to different risk exposures.  Therefore, in order to understand clearly 
the sources of the momentum abnormal returns, it is essential to look into the winners and losers 
separately and investigate the specific risk factors that could affect the winners or losers as a 
group.  Given the overwhelming contribution the loser portfolio makes to the momentum 
abnormal returns, this study will focus on the losers’ side of the phenomenon.   
 Specifically, this study will investigate the role of short-selling constraints and risk in 
loser portfolio in order to explain momentum abnormal returns.  Among all the risks that could 
affect winner and loser portfolios, short-selling constraints and risk are the constraints and risk 
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that impact much more on the loser rather than the winner portfolio.  Therefore, the short-selling 
constraints and risk that the losers are more sensitive to may play a very important role in 
explaining the asymmetric contribution of loser portfolios, and hence the major source of the 
momentum abnormal returns.   
Since the short-selling constraints and risk are much more sensitive to the losers, it may 
not reflect a significant level of explanatory power if the total momentum abnormal returns are 
examined.  Unlike previous literature that has focused on the explanations of the total 
momentum abnormal returns, one of the contributions of this study is to investigate the short-
selling risk on only the component momentum returns from the losers’ side.    
The short-selling constraints and risk this essay investigates are the constraints and risks 
that, due to economic and cultural reasons, make the investors (1) to bear higher costs or (2) to 
live with the fact that short-selling is not always feasible due to regulatory restrictions or cultural 
biases, or (3) to cope with the limited availability of stock to borrow, or (4) to shoulder the costs 
of the premature short-squeeze repayment7, or (5) to bear the very high borrowing costs if the 
stocks are special. 
The most challenging impediment that researchers must attempt to overcome in our type 
of research is the unobservability of the short-selling constraints.  There are two major ways to 
address this issue: (1) with proxy and (2) without proxy.  Early research started by using the 
short-interest ratio to proxy for the short-selling constraints.  Later, this proxy was criticized as 
being uninformative about short-selling constraints and risk because there is an ambiguous 
                                                 
7 When stock prices go up, short seller losses get higher, as sellers rush to buy the stock to cover their positions.  
This rush creates a higher demand for the stock and quickly drives up the price even further.  This phenomenon is 
known as a short-squeeze.  Premature short-squeeze repayment is the payments or the losses the short sellers are 
forced to put in the accounts or to assume in liquidating their position, due to margin call, when short-squeeze 
happens.   Accessed on April 3,2010, at  http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling3.asp 
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causality between short interest ratio and short-selling constraints.  To wit, stocks may have low 
level of short interest because there is low demand to short or they are subject to severe short-
selling constraints.  Another stream of proxies was developed under the framework of demand 
and supply.  It is argued that stocks are short-selling-constrained when there is a strong demand 
to sell short and a limited supply of shares to borrow (Asquith, Pathak and Ritter, 2005).  
Therefore, two variables are used together to proxy the short-selling constraints.  Asquith, Pathak, 
and Ritter (2005) use short interest ratios as a proxy for short-selling demand, and institutional 
ownership as a proxy for lendable supply.  They define the short-selling-constrained stocks as 
those with the highest short interest ratios and lowest institutional ownership.  However, as 
mentioned earlier, short interest ratios may not be a good proxy for shorting demand, because the 
measure is confounded.  They argue that short-selling constraints are not common, because only 
5% of the stocks on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ have more short interest than their 
institutional ownership.  However, shorting demand is a different concept than realized short 
interest.  That institutional ownership is larger than realized short interest does not clearly imply 
the shorting demand is fully satisfied, because stock availability is only one type of short-selling 
constraints.  There can be other constraints, for example, uptick rules, which prohibited the short-
selling transactions in certain circumstances before July 2005.  Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007) 
utilize the price-quantity pairs to gauge short-selling risk in stocks.  By using a proprietary 
dataset consisting of loan fees and quantities shorted from a large institutional investor, they 
employ loan fees as shorting price, and percentage of shares on loan as quantity to gauge the 
short-selling constraints.  They argue that an increase in the loan fee coupled with an increase in 
the percentage of outstanding shares on the loan correspond to an outward shift of the shorting 
demand.  Similarly, a decrease in loan fees coupled with a decreased loan quantity represents an 
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inward shift of the shorting demand.  However, their proprietary dataset includes only one 
institutional investor within a four-year span8. 
It is well known in the literature that short-selling activities are unreasonably low in the 
market.  The majority of stocks virtually have no short interest outstanding at any given point of 
time (Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002).  The realizable demand for shorting is probably much larger 
than the recorded short interest.  However, due to some short-selling constraints and risk, the 
realizable demand is not observable.  In this way, instead of serving as a usual proxy for shorting 
demand, short interest actually represents the realized shorting demand.  Therefore, if we could 
find out the realizable demand for short-selling, then the difference between the realizable 
shorting demand and the realized shorting demand represents the shares subject to some type of 
short-selling constraints.  This difference can serve as an alternative proxy for short-selling 
constraints.  Through this method, the short-selling constraints and risk are proxied by one 
variable.  This new method not only addresses the confounding problem of short interest ratios, 
but also avoids establishing another proxy for supply.  More importantly, this proxy accounts for 
all types of short-selling constraints, named or unnamed, that have hindered potential short-
selling transactions.  Therefore, it is a more complete proxy for short-selling constraints.  The 
measure also complements the study of investigating only one short-selling constraint---stock 
availability under the framework of demand and supply.   
Due to the short-selling constraints, the observed short interest ratio only reflects part of 
the realizable shorting demand.  Therefore, the realizable shorting demand should be always 
equal to or greater than the recorded short interest ratio, depending on the extent of short-selling 
constraints.  In other words, the observed short interest ratio always gives us the lower bound of 
                                                 
8 Hence, this sample cannot be representative of the entire shorting market.   
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the realizable shorting demand.  By the same token, theoretically, the shorting supply is a natural 
upper bound of shorting demand that can be realized.  D’Avolio (2002) shows that the main 
suppliers of stock loans for short sales are institutional investors.  Furthermore, Nagel (2005) 
argues that short sales depend heavily on the existing owners of a stock, because the nonowner 
investors cannot sell the shares short without borrowing shares from the existing owners in the 
first place.  Based on the research of Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), institutional ownership 
is greater than short sales for 95% of stocks among 5,500 domestic operating companies trading 
on the NYSE and NASDAQ markets over the entire time period of 1980-2002.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to use institutional ownership as a conservative upper bound for the realizable 
shorting demand.   
    In our theoretical design, the realizable shorting demand always falls within an interval, 
with the censoring values varying for each observation.  Therefore, an interval regression can be 
used to estimate the realizable shorting demand given the suppressed short interest ratio and 
conservative institutional ownership.  The interval regression is a generalization of the censored-
normal model and the tobit model.  While the tobit model requires one censoring threshold for 
all the observations, the interval model allows the censoring values to vary across individual 
observations.  Compared to the censored-normal model, which only allows single-sided 
censoring, i.e., left or right censoring, the interval model permits the data to have double-sided 
censorings.  Specifically, in the interval regression, the dependent variable for each observation 
can be either point data, where the lower and upper bounds are the same as the observed value, 
or interval data where the lower and upper bounds are different9.  
                                                 
9 For example, it is left-censored data where the lower bound is negative infinity, or right-censored data where the 
upper bound is positive infinity 
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After estimating the realizable shorting demand by using the pooled interval regression 
model, our study will investigate first the direction and magnitude that various factors exert on 
the realizable shorting demand.  These market and individual stock factors are: (a) market to 
book ratio as in Barberis and Shleifer (2003); (b) institutional ownership, as in Nagel (2005); (c) 
analyst forecast dispersion as in Diether et al. (2002); (d)  trading volume as in Lee and 
Swaminatham (2000); (e)  liquidity as in Sadka (2006); (f) firm level volatility as in Ang et al. 
(2006); (g) size as in Lewellen (2002);  and (h) options, call or put, as in Ofek, Richardson and 
Whitelaw (2004).  Secondly, the study uses the obtained proxy for short-selling constraints from 
the pooled interval regression model to examine directly whether and how well the short-selling 
constraints can explain the momentum abnormal returns from the loser portfolio.   
The pooled interval regression shows that short sale is a contrarian sign, and investors 
tend to short more when the current and past returns are high.  Similarly if the stock has a 
potential of price increase as indicated by a high market-to-book ratio, the shorting demand 
declines.  Furthermore, short sellers are rational in taking risks and try to avoid unnecessary risks.  
When the market has higher past return volatility or higher controversy about stock valuation, 
the short sellers will short less to avoid potential higher risk.  Similarly, if a particular stock is 
more liquid as indicated by a higher trading volume or by a large but not too large firm size, the 
shorting demand increases.  Therefore, even though in literature trading volume has been treated 
as proxy for either liquidity or difference of opinions, our study shows that it is more of a proxy 
for liquidity.  We also find that short sellers are informed, rather than noise traders.  For example, 
when the market indicates that it is more likely the information will be permanently embedded in 
the stock price, the shorting demand becomes higher.  Option markets also have complementary 
rather than substitution effects on short sales.   
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By double sorting the above control variables and the short-selling constraints, we find 
strong evidences that short-selling constraints demonstrate an independent and persistent 
explanatory power in predicting the cross-sectional variation of stock returns, even after holding 
the control variables constant.  More importantly, these cross-sectional variation of stock returns 
consistently show the same pattern that stocks which are most severely short-selling constrained 
generate the lowest returns.  This is because when stocks are short-selling constrained; the 
pessimistic information will not be released to the stock price quickly.  Thus, those stocks are 
severely overpriced and the returns are significantly smaller.     
To further investigate how strong and important the short-selling constraints in 
explaining the momentum abnormal returns, we run and compare the Fama-French three factor 
model and our modified four factor model with the short-selling constraints as the fourth factor 
on the momentum portfolio returns.  It is well known in literature that the Fama-French three 
factor model is the most efficient model in predicting the cross-sectional stock return variations.  
However, our four factor model improves the explanatory power of the original Fama-French 
three factor model significantly on the momentum portfolio returns.  More interestingly, the 
increase of the explanatory power of our modified four factor model comes from the loser 
portfolio returns, rather than the winner portfolio returns.  This asymmetric explanatory power 
between the loser and winner portfolio returns clearly verifies our previous idea that short-selling 
constraint is a risk loading that affects losers most.  Furthermore, it does capture additional risk 
loading that the well-established Fama-French three factor model does not pick up. 
Our study also provides an answer to the long-puzzled phenomenon that when NASDAQ 
stocks are added into the portfolio, the returns from the momentum strategy decrease greatly.  
We find that the decrease of the momentum returns asymmetrically comes from the increase of 
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loser portfolio returns.  However, adding in the NASDAQ stocks does not change the returns 
from the winner portfolio much.  The increase in loser portfolio returns can be attributed to the 
shorting environment in the NASDAQ market.  Through two sample t-tests and ordinary least 
squares regression, we find that the short-selling constraints are significantly less in the 
NASDAQ market than in the NYSE & AMEX.  Therefore, pessimistic information can be 
reflected into stock price more quickly for the NADSAQ stocks, which leads to less overpricing 
or higher returns in the losers from the NASDAQ market.   
We also use the proxy of short-selling constraints developed in our study to verify 
whether the price tests are efficient tools in the short sale markets.  By utilizing paired t-tests and 
two-sample t-tests on the difference of difference in the SEC pilot program, we find price tests 
are not effective tools in controlling short-selling activities.  This is mainly because short sellers 
can avoid the price restrictions by routing their orders to other markets that do not have such 
rules.  This phenomenon is prominent in the NASDAQ market.  Thus, it further supports the 
previous finding that NASDAQ stocks are less short-selling constrained.  Based on these 
findings, we suggest the removal of the tick and bid rules in both markets, under normal market 
conditions to reduce the regulatory burden that has no significant regulatory benefits.  However, 
this conclusion may not be suitable under abnormal market conditions, such as market crash, 
when aggressive shorting is more likely to happen.  
The contributions of our study to the extant literature are: First, unlike previous studies 
which use the same risk factors to explain the total or the combination of both the winners’ and 
the losers’ returns, our study argues that the impact of the risk factors to the long and short sides 
are different; hence, we investigate the short-selling risk particular to the short side returns, 
which comprise the bulk of the momentum abnormal returns.  Second, our study creates a more 
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complete proxy for short-selling constraints, which includes almost all types of short-selling 
constraints.  This new proxy complements the previous studies that focused on one short-selling 
constraint, stock availability under the framework of demand and supply.  Third, our study also 
provides an explanation on how shorting demand is determined, and how different market and 
individual stock characteristics can affect it.  Fourth, our study is the first study to solve the long-
observed puzzle in momentum literature that when NASDAQ stocks are included in the strategy, 
the momentum returns drop substantially.  Finally, our study also offers collateral evidence to the 
long debated overpriced-stock question from a different viewpoint, i.e., the momentum strategy 
perspective.   
 
II. Short-Selling Risks 
 
Short selling is the trading technique used by investors who try to profit from an expected 
downward trend of stock prices.  Short selling is a very risky technique that requires precise 
timing and runs contrary to the overall movement of the market.  Even if the investors correctly 
identify the overpriced stock, they could lose money as the overpriced stock could have been 
even more overpriced.  Furthermore, the investors who sell short face unlimited downside 
potential for losses as the stock price can also rise without cap.   
 
2.1. Short-Selling Mechanics 
 
 Short-selling mechanics are different and more complicated compared to the long 
transaction.  Short sale involves selling a stock that the seller does not own.  Therefore, the seller 
has to borrow shares from the lender with collateral and simultaneously sell them at the current 
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market price.  At this point, the stock borrowers need to pay a fee to the lender as part of the 
transaction costs.  At the same time, since the collateral the seller gives to the lender while 
borrowing is almost always cash, the lender need to pay an interest rate to the borrower on 
holding the cash for a period.  The difference of the fee that the borrower needs to pay the lender 
and the interest rate on cash collateral that the lender needs to pay the borrower is called the 
rebate rate.  If the stocks are easy to borrow then the rebate rate is positive, which means the 
lender needs to pay the rebate rate to the borrower by holding an amount of cash collateral for a 
period of time.  In this situation, the stocks are called general collateral.  However, if the stocks 
are hard to borrow, the fee the borrower needs to pay to the lender could be very high, such that 
the fee exceeds the interest rate charged on the cash collateral that the lender needs to pay.  In 
this way, the rebate rate reflects a negative number, which indicates that not only the lender can 
hold the cash for free; the borrower will pay additional money to get a stock loan.  In this 
situation, the stocks are called special.  At a specific date in the future, the seller has to return the 
borrowed shares to the lender.  If the stock price drops, the seller can profit from the difference 
of the beginning and ending price plus the interest rate on cash collateral less the commissions 
and borrowing costs if the stocks are special.  
 
2.2. Short-Selling Risks 
 
 Short selling involves many unique risks, such as regulations, institutional and cultural 
biases, availability of stocks, high borrowing costs if stocks are special and premature short-
squeeze repayment.   
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had Rule 10a-1 under the Security 
Exchange Act of 1934, which provided that investors must sell short a listed stock either at a 
price above the preceding sale price, known as the plus tick or at the last sale price if it was 
higher than the last different price, known as the zero plus tick. Similarly, NASDAQ Rule 3350 
provided that short sales in NASDAQ stocks be either higher or at the best bid when the best bid 
was below the preceding best bid (Bai, 2007).  In other words, regulations prohibit selling short 
the stock if it is already in the downturn.  This rule in effect prevents traders from earning large 
profits by driving down a stock price through heavy short selling first, and then taking a long 
position.  In addition, short selling is margin trading, and the seller must meet the minimum 
maintenance requirement of 25 percent; otherwise the seller will be subject to a margin call.   
Almazan et al. (1999) also points out that 70 percent of mutual funds explicitly state (in 
Form N-SAR handed to the SEC) that short selling is not permitted, and only 2% actually do sell 
short due to cultural biases.  
Since the lender maintains the right to cancel a loan at any time, the seller faces recall 
risk of the borrowed securities.  Much worse, if a stock starts to rise and a large number of short 
sellers try to cover their positions at the same time; the sellers will face a short squeeze, which 
can drive the price even higher.  
The short sellers may not able to locate the shares to borrow in the market.  When the 
demand to short a stock exceeds the supply in the market, the stock becomes special and the 





2.3. SEC Pilot Program 
 
 In order to gather data and study thoroughly the effect of the uptick rule on market 
volatility, price efficiency and liquidity, the SEC implemented a Pilot Program from May 2, 
2005 to July 3, 2007.  This Pilot Program suspended the uptick rule on one-third of Russell 3000 
Index constituent stocks with high levels of liquidity.  On July 3, 2007, the SEC finally abolished 
Rule 10a-1 and any rule of exchanges, including NASDAQ 3350, which applied a bid test on 
short sales (Bai, 2007).    
 There were three categories of pilot stocks in the program.  Category A securities were 
not subject to the uptick rule, Category B securities were not subject to the rule from 4:15pm ET 
until the open of the consolidated tape10 the next day at 4:00am ET.  All other securities were 
included in Category C and were not subject to the rule from the close of the consolidated tape at 
8:00pm ET until the open of the consolidated tape the next day.  Since April 2005 the 
consolidated tape opens at 4:00am and closes at 8:00pm (Bai, 2007).					
	
III. Literature Review 
Based on whether or not the argument is in support of the efficient market hypothesis, the 
sources of momentum abnormal returns can be grouped into two competing explanations: 
rational and behavioral explanations.  In addition to the above two explanations, the market 
frictions explanation is a newly developed direction to explain the momentum abnormal returns.  
                                                 
10 The "consolidated tape" is a high-speed, electronic system that constantly reports the latest price and volume data 
on sales of exchange-listed stocks. The data reflected on the consolidated tape derive from various market centers, 
including all securities exchanges, electronic communications networks (ECNs), and third-market broker-dealers. 
The Nasdaq Stock Market runs a similar tape for its securities. Access at http://www.sec.gov/answers/consolt.htm 
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Our study of short-selling risk dwells on the market frictions explanation.  The investigation of 
the role of short-selling risk in the momentum strategy is limited in number.  
 
3.1. Market Frictions Explanation 
 
The literature has long recognized the important role of transaction costs in realizing 
momentum abnormal returns.  However, due to data availability problems, and the lack of 
accurate calculation methods, until recently, only two papers have calculated systematically the 
transaction costs in executing the momentum strategy.    
Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (LSZ) (2004) find that winners and losers traded in the 
equally-weighted momentum strategy are stocks with disproportionately large transaction costs; 
especially losers, characterized as small, low price, high beta, off-NYSE stocks, that are hard to 
sell short and incur the highest trading costs.  Furthermore, it is the loser not the winner 
portfolios that drive the majority of the momentum abnormal returns.  As a result, the transaction 
costs totally erode the illusionary “paper” profit of the equally-weighted momentum strategy.  
They also tested size-based portfolios as in Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), and turnover-based 
portfolios as in Lee and Swaminathan (2000).  But they find that strategies with larger paper 
profits are accompanied by disproportionally larger trading costs.  Therefore, they bring up the 
market frictions explanation that slower price updating is due to larger trading costs, as a 
competing theory to the slow information diffusion explanation introduced by Hong and Stein 
(1999).     
Unlike LSZ (2004), Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) provide some evidence to support the 
inefficient market hypothesis.  They argue that transaction costs, in the form of spreads and price 
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impacts of trades, do not fully explain the abnormal profits from the value-weighted and 
liquidity-weighted momentum strategies.  However, their calculation of transaction costs is not 
complete, because short-selling costs for the loser portfolio are not included.   
Sadka (2006) decomposes the firm-level liquidity into variable and fixed price effects and 
estimates liquidity using intraday data for the period 1983-2001.  He finds that the unexpected 
systematic or market-wide variations of the variable components of liquidity are priced in the 
momentum abnormal returns.  As the variable components of liquidity are typically associated 
with private information, a substantial part of momentum abnormal returns are to compensate for 
the unexpected variations in the aggregate ratio of informed traders to noise traders.  Unlike most 
of the studies that focus on the level of liquidity as a stock characteristic, Sadka emphasizes the 
market-wide liquidity as an undiversifiable risk factor.  The liquidity measure used in his study is 
defined as the price-impact induced by trades.  Because market liquidity risk affects the short 
transactions, the systematic liquidity will be included in the short-selling constraints analysis.  
Our study is probably the first research utilizing this liquidity index to examine the short-selling 
constraints and momentum strategy.  
Sadka and Scherbina (2007) document a close link between stock mispricing and 
liquidity by investigating stocks with high analyst disagreement about future earnings.  They 
show that heterogeneous beliefs tend to be associated with high transaction costs.  Therefore, 
selling such high-disagreement stocks is considerably less profitable after accounting for the 
extra transaction costs.  They also conjecture that this can be a reason that mispricing has 
persisted through the years.  This observed positive relationship between analyst disagreement 
and trading costs is consistent with the theoretical models, which predict that trading costs 
increase with the degree of information asymmetry between the market maker and informed 
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investors, and decrease with the amount of noise trading.  Because the higher the analyst 
disagreement about future earnings, the higher the information asymmetry among the market 
participants.  Therefore, the market makers will raise the cost of trading to protect themselves 
against potential adverse selection.  Sadka and Scherbina find that in the cross-section of high-
disagreement stocks, less liquid stocks are more likely to be overpriced, evidenced by their low 
future returns relative to that of more liquid stocks.  In the time series, changes in aggregate 
liquidity are negatively related to the magnitude of mispricing.  Increases in the liquidity reduce 
the costs of arbitrage and accelerate the convergence of prices to fundamentals.  
 Ali and Trombley (2006) is the first paper to examine the role of short-selling constraints 
in preventing the arbitrage of momentum abnormal returns.  Loan fees charged by the lenders are 
direct costs of short selling and are treated as the proxy for the short-selling constraints in this 
study.  However, due to data availability problems, they construct Prob as a proxy for a stock 
being special.  Prob is estimated by the predicted cumulative distribution function of the Logit 
model regressed by D’ Avolio (2002).  Six significant variables in the Logit model are selected 
to estimate Prob, namely, Size, IO (institutional ownership), Turn (turnover ratio), CF (cash 
flow), IPO, and Glam (indicator variable equal to 1 if the stock is in the lowest three deciles of 
book-to-market).  The coefficients used in D’ Avolio (2002) are averages of individual monthly 
regressions.  Ali and Trombley examine the momentum abnormal returns by first sorting Size, IO, 
Turn, CF, IPO, Glam and Prob individually.  The results show that portfolios with smaller size, 
higher turnover, lower cash flow, lower institutional ownership, IPOs, lowest three deciles of 
book-to-market, and higher short-selling constraints have higher momentum abnormal returns.  
The notable finding is that for all these sorting criteria, the winners’ portfolios do not vary much, 
and the majority of the momentum abnormal returns are driven from the losers’ portfolios.  The 
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authors then double sort Prob, with size, residual analyst coverage, price, turnover ratio and 
frequency of zero-return trading days.  They find that momentum abnormal returns are 
significant most of the time and thus Prob has an incremental explanatory power for momentum 
abnormal returns.    
 Boni and Womack (2006) show that analysts create value in their recommendations 
mainly through their ability to rank stocks within industries, in which they specialize.  They find 
that the monthly momentum strategy within each industry of buying the firms net upgraded by 
analysts while selling short net downgraded firms yields 1.23 percent in the next calendar month, 
which is about 30 percent more than a similar non-industry approach.  Furthermore, among the 
total of 57 industries, 54 industries are nominally positive, and 16 industries are significantly 
positive.  This short-term price momentum may be partly driven by returns of firms with more 
analyst coverage leading the returns of firms with less coverage in the same industry.  However, 
when analyst information are aggregated across industries, the momentum strategy of buying 
stocks in net upgraded industries and shorting stocks in net downgraded industries generally does 
not offer statistically significant returns.  
  
3.2. Proxies for Short-selling Constraints 
 
 Because short-selling risk is unobservable, financial researchers have tried many different 
variables to proxy it.  The oldest proxy for short-selling risk is short-interest ratios.  Later 
because of data availability from large institutions, the loan fee, i.e. the rebate on the borrowed 
stock, is used as a direct proxy to gauge the short-selling risk.  Most recently, institutional 
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ownership of stocks has been considered as another proxy for short-selling constraints, because 
most short transactions are conducted by the institutions.   
Figlewski (1981) first uses short interest as a proxy for short-selling constraints.  This 
underlying logic is that the more the shorting demand is, the more likely it is subject to short-
selling constraints.  Thus, he uses the short interest as a proxy for actual shorting demand, and as 
a result, a proxy for short-selling constraints.  Many papers follow suit, such as Brent et al. 
(1990), Figlewski and Webb (1993), Wooldridge and Dickinson (1994), Asquith and Meulbroek 
(1995), and Dechow et al. (2001).   
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) argue that the use of actual short interest as proxy of short-
selling constraints could reduce the test power of the relationship between short-selling 
constraints and subsequent stock returns.  First, because a stock with low or zero short interest 
could be the one that is hard or costly to sell short, it may hold back more negative information 
from the market price.  Second, tracking the abnormal returns of a portfolio of high-short-interest 
stocks only potentially reduces the test power and generalizability of the results.  Instead, they 
use breadth of ownership, which is defined as the number of investors with long positions in a 
particular stock, as a more reliable proxy for how tightly short-selling constraints bind.  They 
argue that when breadth for a stock is lower, fewer investors are trading on the stock and less 
pessimistic information is released to the market.   
Jones and Lamont (2002) study the effect of short-selling constraints on stock returns 
from 1926 to 1933, when the costs of borrowing stocks are publicly available.  They criticize the 
short interest as a proxy for shorting demand.  The quantity of shorting represents the 
equilibrium of supply and demand, not just demand.  Short interest can be negatively correlated 
with shorting demand, overpricing and shorting costs.  They argue that the problematic nature of 
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short interest leads to weak empirical results.  Instead, they use the rebate rate as the proxy for 
short-selling constraints.  They find stocks that are expensive to short or enter the borrowing 
market have high valuations and low subsequent returns, which is consistent with the overpricing 
hypothesis.       
Gene D’ Avolio (2002) introduces a supply and demand framework to proxy short-selling 
constraints the first time in literature.  He uses a special 18 month dataset provided by a large 
institutional lending intermediary on loan supply, loan fees, and loan recalls.  He treats loan fees 
and recalls as short-selling constraints.  
Nagel (2005) categorizes the short-selling constraints into indirect and direct constraints.  
The indirect constraints come from institutional and cultural reasons, which result in a general 
lack of short-selling in the stock market.  If the existing owners are not sophisticated enough, the 
stock can become overpriced, because other sophisticated investors cannot sell it short.  Since 
institutional investors are likely to be more sophisticated than the general public, indirect 
constraints are more likely to affect stocks with low institutional ownership.  The direct 
constraints come from the cost of short-selling.  Since the main suppliers of stock loans are 
institutional investors (D’ Avolio, 2002), stocks with low institutional ownership are harder to 
borrow and thus incur higher costs.  Therefore, both direct and indirect short-selling constraints 
indicate that institutional ownership plays an important role in the short transaction, and Nagel 
uses institutional ownership to proxy short-selling constraints.  Because size can also affect 
market friction and serve as an impediment to arbitrage other than the short-selling mechanism, 
Nagel uses residual institutional ownership in the empirical tests to purge out the size effects.  
The residual institutional ownership is obtained as the residual in the cross-sectional regressions 
where size is the independent variable.  
72 
 
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) further develop the supply and demand framework 
introduced by D’ Avolio (2002).  They argue that stocks were short-sale-constrained when there 
is a strong demand to short and a limited supply to borrow.  They use both short interest, which 
proxies for demand and institutional ownership, which proxies for supply to represent the short-
selling constraints.  However, as mentioned before, short interest is an ambiguous proxy for 
shorting demand.  
Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) use the price-quantity pairs to identify the shift of 
shorting supply and demand by using a proprietary data on short sale loan fees and quantities 
from a large institutional investor.  They argue that when the shorting demand shifts outward or 
shorting supply shifts inward, the short-selling constraints are more likely to be severer.  
Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) use the loan fee rather than the rebate rate in their 
study to proxy for the short-selling constraints.  They argue that loan fee is better because it 
properly adjusted for changing in interest rate conditions that impact rebate rates.  However, 
because the fee data are available for only a limited time period, they use the data primarily to 
validate other constraint proxies, like relative short interest and exchange-traded options, and to 
develop a “portmanteau” constraint metric.  This unitary constraint metric is obtained by 
regressing on relative short interest and the dummy variable, options. 
Ali and Trombley (2006) utilize the research by D’ Avolio (2002), and create the variable 
Prob to proxy short-selling risk.  The Prob is constructed as the predicated value of the 
dependent variable conditional on the six significant determinants of a stock being special in the 




3.3. Other Factors Influencing Short-Selling Risk 
 
 The literature has recognized some additional factors that may directly or indirectly affect 
the short interest, such as options, differences of opinion, et cetera.   
 
3.3a Options  
 
 As early as 1993, Figlewski and Webb (1993) had found empirical evidence that options 
facilitate short selling.  They explain this phenomenon as follows: when a put is purchased from 
an option market maker, the market maker will normally hedge by shorting the stock, and/or 
buying a call to reverse the position.  This is equivalent to the income effect.  However, at the 
same time, the introduction of options will substitute for part of the short interest, and hence 
reduce the total short interest.  Figlewski and Webb expect this substitution effect as a weaker 
effect for two reasons.  First, compared to a large number of hedging strategy traders, like 
“protective put” buyers, only a small number of investors are active short sellers.  Second, even 
if former short sellers do switch their trading to options, the options market makers may simply 
respond by shorting the underlying stock themselves to hedge their positions, thus leaving total 
short interest unchanged.  Therefore, the put buyer’s desire to sell the stock is transformed 
through the options market into an actual short sale by a market professional who faces the 
lowest cost and fewest constraints.  Consequently, they argue that introducing options trading 
can potentially reduce or even eliminate the informational effect of short-selling constraints, by 
providing alternative trading strategies for investors with pessimistic information to sell short 
indirectly.  Their empirical results support this argument partially by showing that subsequent 
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underperformance is weakened for optionable stocks.  However, the result is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
 Sorescu (2000) finds that the effect of option introduction on underlying stock prices 
switches during 1973-1995.  While, before July 1981, the option introduction increased stock 
prices, the price effect switched to negative after July 1981.  Although he does not elaborate on 
the specific reasons for this astounding shift, he lists possible causes, such as the introduction of 
index options in 1982, the implementation of regulatory changes in 1981, and the possibility that 
the options help the dissemination of negative information.  
 Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) confirm the results in Sorescu (2000) that option listings 
are followed by negative abnormal returns of the underlying stock during the period of 1981-
1995, and with positive abnormal returns during the period of 1973-1981.  However, for both 
sub-periods, option introductions increase the short sales.  Their study also finds that the negative 
abnormal returns in the post-1981 era are driven by a firm’s beta and the dispersion of investor 
expectations.  This relationship does not exist for the pre-1981 era.   
 Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2004) provide an empirical analysis of put-call parity in 
the context of short-selling constraints.  Violations of put-call parity are asymmetric in the 
direction of the short-selling constraints.  In particular, both the probability and magnitude of the 
violations can be linked directly to the magnitude of the rebate rate, a proxy for short-selling 
constraints.  Moreover, both the size of the violations and the rebate rate predict negative excess 





3.3b Differences of Opinion 
 
 The presence of heterogeneous expectations or differences of investor opinions has been 
modeled in several analyses within the context of asymmetric information.  Many papers have 
attempted to find out the potential relationship between differences of opinion and subsequent 
stock prices.  
 Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) have provided empirical evidence that stocks with 
higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts have lower future returns than similar stocks.  
The supporting theoretical framework is proposed by Miller (1977) that prices will reflect a more 
optimistic valuation if pessimistic investors are kept out of the market by some kind of short-
selling constraints.  Diether et al. argue that the incentive structure of the analysts, which 
discourages analysts from voicing pessimistic forecasts, is just another form of short-selling 
constraint.  Therefore, the bigger the disagreement about a stock’s value, the higher the market 
price relative to the intrinsic value of the stock, and the lower the future returns.  This effect is 
also found most pronounced in small stocks and stocks that have performed poorly over the past 
years.  Diether et al. also test the role of dispersion in analysts’ earnings per share forecasts as a 
proxy for measuring risk, instead of differences of opinion.  Investors who are not well 
diversified will demand to be compensated more for bearing the stock’s idiosyncratic risks.  
Therefore, more dispersion in analysts’ forecasts may indicate more volatile future returns, and 
thus, may serve as compensation for idiosyncratic risks.  However, the negative relationship 
between dispersion and future returns rejects this interpretation of dispersion as a measure of risk.  
They also find the average return differential between the low- and high-dispersion stocks has 
declined in the period 1992-2000, and becomes insignificant for all but the smallest size quintile.  
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They attribute this phenomenon to lower short-selling costs, and more availability of firm-related 
information which lowers the levels of disagreement in analyst opinions.   
 Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that the past trading volume predicts both the 
magnitude and the persistence of future price momentum.  Information contained in past trading 
volume can be useful in reconciling intermediate horizon “underreaction” and long-horizon 
“overreaction” effects.  They further investigate the role of past trading volume for prediction of 
cross-sectional stock returns.  More importantly, they find the trading volume as measured by the 
turnover ratio, is an unlikely candidate as a liquidity proxy.  Trading volume is not highly 
correlated with firm size or relative bid-ask spread, and the volume effect is independent of the 
firm size effect.  Rather, they argue that the information content of the trading volume is related 
to market misperceptions of firms’ future earnings prospects.  This finding indicates that investor 
expectations affect not only a stock’s return but also its trading activity.  Furthermore, they find 
trading volume “fuels” momentum only for losers and helps information “diffusion” only for 
winners.   
 Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) point out that two necessary and sufficient 
conditions for Miller’s overvaluation are that i) the security is subject to short-selling constraints 
and ii) investors have heterogeneous expectations.  They argue that the reason the previous 
empirical studies derive mixed results is that only one of the two conditions is tested at a time.  
Consequently, they reexamine the overvaluation effect in a two-dimensional framework with 
both conditions binding simultaneously.  
Their results suggest that neither the presence of short-selling constraints nor a high 
dispersion of opinions can independently lead to overpricing of the stocks.  However, when these 
two factors are considered simultaneously, they find Miller’s overreaction effects are so severe 
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that the stocks underperform by as much as 21% per year relative to the Fama-French four-factor 
asset-pricing model11 over the period of 1988-2002.  This level of underperformance is 
significantly more severe than observed in any previous study.  Boehme et al. use  three separate 
proxies for differences of opinion: i) dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, ii) idiosyncratic volatility 
of stock returns (SIGMA) and iii) trading volume as a proportion of shares outstanding.  The 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is the coefficient of variation for analysts’ annual forecasts 
estimated from IBES data.  It is derived by dividing the IBES reported standard deviation of 
analyst earnings per share forecasts for the current fiscal year-end by the absolute value of the 
mean earnings per share forecast, as listed in the IBES Summary History file.  SIGMA is the 
standard deviation of the error terms from the Brown and Warner (1985) market model, 
estimated over the 100 days preceding the first day of the month for which the short interest data 
are reported.  
  
IV. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
   Some recent studies have concluded that the contributions of the winner and loser 
portfolios to the momentum abnormal returns are asymmetric.  Surprisingly, the losers, not the 
winners, are the dominant driving force of the puzzling abnormal returns from the momentum 
strategy.  Therefore, the unique characteristics the losers possess (and the risk factors that they 
are more sensitive to) have become a natural focus of the ongoing research.  The losers belong to 
the small, low-price, high-beta, off-NYSE stocks that are typically hard to sell short and involve 
high trading costs (Lesmond, Schill and Zhou, 2004).  Furthermore, unlike the winners, losers 
                                                 






are involved in a different trading activity: short-selling.  Therefore, they are impacted uniquely 
by the short-selling risk that the winners do not face.    
Meanwhile, another avenue of research has grown fast and has argued strongly that short-
selling constraints can withhold pessimistic opinions from the market and can thus lead to an 
overpricing of these stocks.  The baseline for this argument is that when some stocks are 
underpriced, the sophisticated investors with full information could always bid a higher price in 
the market and buy them.  However, if some stocks are overpriced, the sophisticated investors 
cannot sell them if they do not own them in the first place, nor can they borrow them from their 
current owners who do not have enough information and do not believe the stocks they own are 
overpriced12.    
If the above logic makes sense in the market, then the phenomenon of losers continuing 
to perform badly in the momentum strategy may be explained by the short-selling constraints, 
which hinder pessimistic opinions from influencing the prices quickly enough.  However, the 
mechanism underlying the explanation of the short-selling risk is totally different from that of the 
behavioral hypotheses.  The short-selling risk explanation assumes that the investors are rational, 
regardless of whether they are pure or adaptive.  The main hindrance resides in the market 
frictions: regulations, cultural biases, stricter requirements and higher transaction costs.   
 Motivated by the above arguments, our research hypothesizes that the short-selling risk 
may explain a good part of the momentum returns from the loser portfolio, which consists of the 
bulk of the abnormal returns from a momentum strategy.   
                                                 
12 Unless the sophisticated investors are willing to incur higher costs, such as asking for a negative rebate rate from 
the current owners, as an extreme example. 
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Hypothesis 1.Stocks that are most constrained by the short-selling risk generate the lowest 
momentum returns from the loser portfolio.  
 This hypothesis derives from the argument that the behavior of the stocks with the most 
severe short-selling constraints will prevent more pessimistic information from quickly being 
reflected in the price.  Thus, the losers will be more severely overpriced, and the returns will 
be significantly lower. 
 
Hypothesis 2.The short-selling risk independently and significantly explains the momentum 
returns from the loser portfolio.  
If the short-selling risk is able to independently and significantly explain the returns of 
the losers in the momentum strategy, then the continued bad performance of the past losers 
indicates that the past losers are overpriced due to the limits of short-selling.  Otherwise, the 
prices of the past losers would be lower in the first place because the investors can sell them 
short and put enough downward pressure on their prices.  Alternatively, the momentum 
abnormal returns can be explained as a compensation of the market frictions, the short-selling 
risk, for the loser portfolio.  These results will also provide additional insight to the long debated 
conjecture, first raised by Miller (1977), that the short-selling constraints in a market of 
heterogeneous beliefs will cause stock overpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 3. NASDAQ stocks are less short-selling constrained than are NYSE & AMEX stocks.  
This difference may explain the long-observed phenomenon that momentum abnormal returns 
become much smaller when NASDAQ stocks are included. 
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 There is strong empirical evidence that the inclusion of NASDAQ stocks in the 
momentum strategy leads to a drastic reduction in the momentum abnormal returns.  This 
hypothesis is supported by the argument of some researchers (Bai, 2007) that the short-selling 
constraints in the NASDAQ are less severe than those in the NYSE and AMEX.   
 
Question 1. Given the proxy for the short-selling constraints, we can directly check the 
effectiveness of the tick and bid tests in the NYSE and NASDAQ markets.  
 To gather data and thoroughly study the effect of the tick and bid tests on market 
volatility, price efficiency and liquidity, the SEC implemented a pilot program from May 2, 2005, 
to July 3, 2007.  This pilot program suspended the uptick rule on one third of the Russell 3000 
Index constituent stocks with high levels of liquidity.  On July 3, 2007, the SEC finally abolished 
Rule 10a-1 and any rule of exchanges, including NASDAQ 3350, which applied a bid test on 
short sales (Bai, 2007).  Therefore, the pilot program provides a convenient platform to check 
whether the tick and bid tests in the NYSE and NASDAQ markets are effective price restrictions.  
Several studies, such as Bai (2007) and Reg. SHO Pilot Report (2007), have failed to find 
any significant difference in the short interests of both markets across the pilot and control stocks, 
despite the price tests.  In addition, neither of the two studies mentioned above found any 
evidence that the price tests were able to reduce the speed of price decline or overpricing in the 
pilot program.     
 
V. Data and Methodology 
The data on stock returns are collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) Monthly Stock File for NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks.  Throughout the study, 
81 
 
closed-end funds, American Depository Receipts (ADR), real estate investment trusts (REIT), 
and primes and scores13 are excluded.   The short interest data come from two sources.  The 
majority of them are obtained from the Bloomberg database from January 1, 1988 to February 29, 
2008.  The data were backfilled in June, 2008 to update for ticker changes, delisting, and 
acquisitions.  The rest of them are obtained from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database.  The 
short interest data contain most of the companies that are listed in the CRSP.  The variable of 
short interest is the total number of shares investors have sold short but have not yet bought back.  
The short interest ratio (SIR) is the total number of shares an investor has sold short divided by 
the shares outstanding for a specific month14.  
 Data on institutional holdings are extracted from the Thomson Financial Institutional 
Holdings (13F) database.  The quarterly holdings start in the first quarter of 1988 and end in the 
last quarter of 2007.  The shares of institutional ownership are calculated by summing up the 
stock holdings owned by all reporting institutions for each stock in each quarter.  Following 
Gompers and Metrick (2001), stocks that are on CRSP but without any institutional holdings are 
assumed to have zero institutional ownership. We also exclude the observations with institutional 
ownership greater than 100 percent, which are subject to double counting problem.  As 
mentioned in the user’s guide of Thomson Financial database, the spectrum’s records of late 
filings reflect stock splits that have occurred between the report date and the filing date, some 
even reflect stock splits after the filing date.  The longest gap between the report date and filing 
date is two years.  This inconsistency makes the data hard to compare among late filers and on-
                                                 
13 Americus Trust Components that are created by repackaging certain common stocks into a five-year warrant unit 
for the underlying stocks (scores) and a five-year holding unit of the stocks but with a covered call (primes).  
14 This paper  uses short interest to shares outstanding ratio by following Asquith et al. (2005) paper’s argument that 
short interest to shares outstanding ratio is a better measure in reflecting the information of informed investors than 
the traditional  
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time filers.  Therefore, following Nagel (2005), the institutional holdings (13F) database is 
unadjusted for stock splits which occur between the report and filling dates.  Institutional 
ownership (IOS) used in this study is the quotient of the institutional ownership for each 
company and its corresponding shares outstanding.   
 Market-to-book ratio (MB), analyst forecast dispersion (ADISP), firm-level volatility 
(VOL), turnover for current month (TURN) and previous month (lagTURN), Liquidity (LIQ), 
firm size (logSZ) and its squared form (logSZSQ), stock return for current month (RET) and 
previous month (lagRET) and option status (CALL and PUT) are also used to estimate the latent 
shorting demand. 
 The book value of equity is defined as common equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes 
and is obtained from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database.  For each month, the market-to-
book ratio is calculated as the quotient of the market value of equity at month t divided by the 
most recent fiscal year-end book value of equity that is at least six months ahead of month t.  If 
the book value of equity is negative, the market-to-book ratio is set to missing.   
 As in most studies, analyst forecast dispersion (ADISP) is obtained from the Institutional 
Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S).  It is the standard deviation of current fiscal year earnings 
per share forecasts scaled by the absolute value of mean earnings forecasts, for each month from 
January 1988 to December 2007.  Since the I/B/E/S data have a rounding problem related to 
stock splits, the unadjusted summary data in I/B/E/S are used.   
 Firm-level volatility (VOL) is the standard deviation of a firm’s monthly stock returns 
over the last 12 months.  Firm size (logSZ) is the log form of market capitalization.  We also 
include the squared logSZ to capture the possibility of a nonlinear relationship.   
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 Turnover (TURN) is the monthly ratio of trading volume divided by the number of shares 
outstanding from CRSP.  LagTURN is the turnover of the previous month.  As pointed by Atkins 
and Dyl (1997), the dealer market, NASDAQ double counts the buys and sells from the dealers.  
Therefore, to make the stock turnover comparable within all exchanges, we followed Nagel 
(2005) and divided the stock turnover from NASDAQ by two.  
 Liquidity (LIQ) is obtained from Liquidity factors in WRDS.  This variable is derived by 
Sadak in his 2006 paper, and is extracted monthly from January 1988 to December 2005.  
According to Sadak, 2006, firm-level liquidity is decomposed into variable and fixed price 
effects.  Liquidity is the variable or permanent part of price effects.  It is a non-traded, market-
wide, undiversifiable risk factor that is priced in the momentum portfolio returns.  
 Call and Put are monthly data obtained from Bloomberg.  They are all call or put option 
contracts (all strike prices and expiration dates) outstanding for a particular security.  These two 
variables are scaled by shares outstanding in units of thousands.   
 
5.1. Summary Statistics 
 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics for the short interest ratio (SIR), institutional 
ownership (IOS) and predictor variables for the actual shorting demand (SID): MB, ADSIP, 
VOL, TURN (lagTURN), RET (lagRET), logSZ (logSZSQ), LIQ, CALL and PUT.  The sample 
period for the final dataset ran from January, 1988 to December, 2005.   
 Panel A indicates the mean and median values of the above variables.  It is worth noting 
that there is a significant difference between the mean and median values of the SIR.  Although 
most of the stocks have very small short interest throughout the period (the 90 percentile of SIR 
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is less than 6.42%), 0.47% of the SIR observations were larger than 1.  These observations 
sharply increased the mean value.  From 1988 to 1990, the short interest was so sparse that 
almost no short interest was observed; this interval was clearly different from the later years in 
the period.  We do not know whether data are missing or whether there were simply no short 
sales for those three years.  The average numbers of firms per month indicate that the sample 
sizes for the different variables were quite different.  In particular, CALL and PUT obtained 
from the Bloomberg database only have average cross-sectional sample sizes of 1297 and 1284 
firms, respectively, which represent approximately one-third of the sample sizes for the other 
variables.  This gap costs a great deduction of data in the later analysis.  
 All of the correlation coefficients were calculated cross-sectionally for each month and 
then averaged throughout the whole time period in panel B.  Because LIQ is a yearly datum 
without cross-sectional variation, it is excluded in panel B.  TURN, CALL and PUT are strongly 
correlated with each other, with pairwise correlation coefficients ranging from 0.4055 to 0.8367.  
This result indicates that when the equity market is trading actively, the option market 
corresponds.  The very high correlation between CALL and PUT may result from divergent 
opinions in the market or from option trading strategies.  The variable SIR is strongly correlated 
with the variables CALL, PUT, TURN, IOS, and logSZ, with pairwise correlation coefficients 
ranging from 0.1263 to 0.5697.  These correlations indicate that short sales are more active when 
equity and option markets are more active.  As a variable IOS is a proxy for the potential supply 
of loanable stocks, the positive correlation between SIR and IOS indicates that stocks with 
greater institutional holdings tend be shorted more easily.  This finding is consistent with extant 
literature that stock supply is a necessary but not sufficient condition for short sales and that 
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institutional holdings are very important source of supply.  Similar to the finding of Nagel (2005), 
the variables IOS and logSZ exhibited a strong positive correlation, at a level of 0.6625. 
 
5.2. Pooled Interval Regression and the True Demand for Shorting 
 
 If short-selling constraints do exist in the market, then the short interest ratio we observed 
was a distorted demand measure with some of the shorting demand suppressed by the short-
selling constraints.  Therefore, instead of being a proxy for the shorting demand, it only revealed 
partial demand or realized demand.  The more short-selling is constrained, the more shorting 
demand is suppressed and the less realized shorting demand is reflected.  The difference between 
the realizable demand and the realized demand is the short-selling constraints quantified in the 
number of shares that could not be shorted by the short-sellers.  
Because the observed short interest ratio reflects the constrained demand, it is always the 
lower bound of the realizable shorting demand.  That is, the realizable shorting demand is always 
equal to or greater than the reflected short interest ratio, depending on the extent of the short-
selling constraints.  Asquith et al (2005) discovered that, on a firm-by-firm basis over the entire 
time period of 1980-2002, 95% of their sample stocks in an average month had institutional 
ownership greater than the short interest.  This finding means that, for 95% of the data, the 
availability of the stock is not a constraint that hinders short sales.  Therefore, our study used the 
institutional ownership as a conservative upper bound for the realizable shorting demand.  
However, the use of this conservative upper bound meant that one short-selling constraint, stock 
availability from the institutional investors, was ignored.  This factor means that the actual short-
selling constraints should be equal to (or even higher than) the estimated short-selling constraints, 
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as long as the stock falls in the 5% cases in which the stock availability from institutional 
investors cannot be satisfied and acts as another short-selling constraint.  Using this theoretical 
design, the realizable shorting demand belongs to the category of interval data with the observed 
short interest ratio as the lower bound and the institutional ownership as the conservative upper 
bound.   
 Interval regression is a generalization of the censored-normal-regression and the tobit 
models.  Unlike the tobit model, which requires one threshold censoring value for all of the 
observations, the interval regression allows the censoring values to vary from observation to 
observation.  Although the censored-normal-regression provides the varying censoring values, it 
only allows for three options: not censored (0), right-censored (+1) or left-censored (-1).  
Therefore, among these three possible models, the interval regression best fits the short-selling 
data for cases in which the censoring value fluctuates for each observation and, at the same time, 
the true values are bounded by an interval.  
Interval regression can fit models for data in which each observation represents interval 
data, left-censored data, right-censored data, or point data.  Specifically, interval regression fits a 
model of y = [depvar1, depvar2] on independent variables, where the y for each observation is 
either point data, interval data, left-censored data, or right-censored data (Stata Reference Book, 
p. 506).  Depvar1 and depvar2 should have the following form:  
                Type of data     depvar1           depvar2 
                 Point data    a = [a,   a]       a  a 
      Interval data                              [a,   b]       a                  b 
      Left-censored data          (-∞, b]        .                   b 




If we know that the value for Jth individual is somewhere in the interval [y1j, y2j], then the 
likelihood contribution from this individual is simply Pr ( ≤ ≤ ).  For the censored data, 
their likelihoods contain terms of the form Pr (	 ) for left-censored data and  
Pr (  ) for right-censored data, where  is the observed censoring value and 	denotes the 
random variable representing the dependent variable in the model.   
 This study utilized pooled interval regression with cluster robust errors.  Pooled interval 
regression treats the whole sample as a long cross section of size N*T.  Cluster robust errors 
were used to catch the potential correlation of the dependent variable within a cluster (i.e., an 
individual firm in this study), possibly through unobserved cluster effects.   
  The linear interval regression model with cluster effects is specified as 
 
, 





), such that 
 





.  The advantage of pooled interval regression is 
that, with T fixed and N approaching infinity, the pooled interval estimator is consistent and √ -
is asymptotically normal without any assumptions that are required for fixed and random effect 
panel data regressions, other than identification and standard regularity conditions.  For example, 
the pooled interval estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal even under the following 
conditions: the error terms are arbitrarily serially correlated, the dynamics are not correctly 
specified, and the independent variables are not strictly exogenous (Wooldridge, Econometric 
Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data).  Our data satisfy the conditions for T and N: a large 
number of clusters N and a relatively small group size T.  However, the usual standard errors and 
test statistics reported from a pooled analysis are not valid, and robust versions should be 
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adopted to make the inferences in the pooled interval regression robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and cluster correlation.  The following corrected asymptotic covariance matrix 
is used when the observations occurring in groups may be correlated.  . .
∑ ∑ ∑ ′ , where V is the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix and 
is the vector of derivatives of the log likelihood for observation i in cluster j.  V = 
[∑ ∑ ∑  
(Stata Reference Book) 
 
VI. Estimated Realizable Shorting Demand and Short-selling Constraints 
 
  This section presents the results of the pooled interval regression, analyzes the 
determinants of the realizable shorting demand, and derives the short-selling constraints that will 
be used to explain the abnormal returns from the momentum strategy.  Through our research 
design, we will use institutional ownership as a conservative upper bound to estimate the 
realizable shorting demand.  Therefore, we will only focus on a subset of the database: 
observations with a short interest ratio less than or equal to the institutional ownership.   
 
6.1. Short Interest Ratio and Institutional Ownership 
 
 Figure 1 plots the time series of monthly short interest data and quarterly institutional 
ownership data with all the observations over the period of January, 1988 to December, 2005.  
Three ratios are reported in the chart: the median and 95th percentile of the SIR and the median 
of the IOS.  The figure indicates that 1) over the whole period, the level of short interest ratio 
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maintains a very low profile, well below 5%; 2) the 95th percentile of the short interest ratio 
exhibited a similar pattern to the median of the institutional ownership, indicating that these two 
ratios are probably connected closely through some mechanism, for example, institutional 
ownership is an important source of loanable shares for short sales; 3) the median values of 
institutional ownership are many times larger than those of the short interest ratio throughout the 
whole time period; and 4) even the 95th percentile of short interest ratio was significantly less 
than the median of institutional ownership for almost all of the entire period, with the exception 
of two months: November and December, 1990.  This finding implies that, as an important 
source of loanable stocks for short sales, institutional ownership can satisfy the majority of 
shorting demand and is a legitimate upper bound for the realizable shorting demand when 
making conservative assumptions.   
Finally, about 4.97% of the data with short-interest ratio larger than the institutional 
ownership were dropped to estimate the pooled interval regression model.  This result confirms 
the findings of Asquith et al (2005) that only 5% of the institutional ownership was less than the 
short interest ratio in the whole sample over the entire time span.  However, it is still worthwhile 
to investigate whether the firms being dropped have certain special characteristics that 
distinguish them from the retained firms.  Table 6 compares the summary statistics between the 
two groups: those with a short interest ratio larger than the corresponding institutional ownership 
and those with a short interest ratio no larger than the corresponding institutional ownership.   
Two-sample t-tests were calculated to identify the differences between the two groups15.  
The results indicate that the two groups have statistically different characteristics at the 1% 
significance level.  Compared to the “SIR IOS” group, the “SIR>IOS” group stocks are 
                                                 
15 Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on medians derive similar results. 
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glamour stocks with smaller sizes and higher past returns.  They have more heterogeneous 
opinions, as indicated by the higher analyst forecast dispersion, the higher past 12-month return 
volatility, and the higher turnover.  They also have more active secondary option markets, as 
reflected by the higher call and put open interest.  The short interest in the “SIR>IOS” group was 
higher, which also occurs when the market liquidity risk is lower.  For IOS, 52.67% of the 
observations in the “SIR>IOS” group are the ones with assigned value of 0 when the 
observations were not available in the Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) database.  
Therefore, when there are values for short interest ratio, no matter how large they are, they 
exceed its corresponding institutional ownership.  Those 0 institutional ownership observations 
(number=16675) pull the median of IOS down to 0 in the “SIR>IOS” group.  However, even if 
those 0 institutional ownership observations are excluded, the IOS median (0.0199)16 is still 
significantly smaller than that of the “SIR<IOS” group (0.3468).  Given the higher short interest, 
and lower institutional ownership and the active trading (both in the stock and option markets), 
those stocks should rely more on individual investors for short sales.  Due to the different 
characteristics of the “SIR>IOS” group, we should be cautious about applying the later results in 
this category, which was excluded from the regression model in the first place.  
 
6.2. Estimated Interval Regression Model 
 
 Stock return, liquidity, dispersion of opinions, and option markets have been well 
documented in previous research as determinants of shorting demand. 
                                                 
16 The summary statistics of the subgroup without 0 institutional ownership observations in the “SIR>IOS” category 
are not shown in the Table II. 
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 RET, lagRET, and MB are return indicators.  Short-sellers can only profit when there is a 
potential overpricing or predicted future price downturn.  So they will short more when current 
or past return indicators are high.  Diether et al. (2008) found that short-selling activity was 
strongly positively related to past returns.  D’Avolio (2002) found that glamour stocks, i.e., 
stocks with high market-to-book ratios, increased the borrowing cost and the likelihood of being 
special.  Therefore, a high market-to-book ratio should decrease the shorting demand.   
 VOL, TURN and ADSIP are proxies for differences of opinion or valuation dissonance.  
D’Avolio (2002) found that stocks with high turnover have a higher probability of being special.  
However, he was unable to find any statistically significant relationship between analyst 
dispersion and the borrowing cost of the stocks.   
 Liquidity affects stock returns and, thus, shorting demand.  LIQ, TURN, and logSZ are 
liquidity indicators.  Besides the new role of serving as the proxy for differences of opinion, 
stock turnover has been a traditional proxy for liquidity.  Both Datar et al. (1998) and Brennan et 
al. (1998) documented that stocks with a high trading volume tended to earn lower future returns.  
Hence, a high trading volume should boost the demand to short if it is a proxy for liquidity rather 
than for valuation dissonance.  LIQ is the market-wide liquidity risk, developed by Sadka (2006), 
which was found to be priced in the cross-sectional variation of stock returns.  Our study is the 
first to utilize this undiversifiable risk factor for measuring the shorting demand.  It is also 
commonly believed that stocks of large firms are more liquid with less information asymmetry, 
factors that should facilitate short sales.   
 Option markets are closely related to the stock markets.  Option trading may facilitate or 
substitute for short sales.  Figlewski and Webb (1993) indicated that optioned stocks were more 
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heavily shorted than non-optioned stocks and that option introductions coincide with increased 
short-selling of the underlying stock.    
 Specifically, in our study, the pooled interval regression can be expressed as	
∗ 	 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
, 	 .  
 The pooled interval regression was run from January, 1988 to December, 2005.  The 
dependent variable was the latent shorting demand, which is bounded within the interval in 
which the actual short interest was the lower limit and the institutional ownership was a 
conservative upper limit.  The standard errors were adjusted for the cluster effect.  The first 
column of Table 7 lists all of the independent variables.  The likelihood-ratio chi-squared test 
gauges the difference between the full model (with predictors) and the constant only model.  The 
chi-squared test indicates that the whole model was statistically significant at the 1% level.  All 
of the coefficients were significant at the 1% level.  All of the observations in the regression had 
unequal lower and upper bounds.  The McFadden’s adjusted R-square was 0.235.  Among the 
total of 135,116 predicted values, 1,787 observations (1.323 percent) were left censored and took 
on the value of the short interest ratio (i.e., the lower bound) and 4,117 observations (3.047 
percent) were right censored and took on the value of the institutional ownership (i.e., the upper 
bound). The remaining 129,212 observations (95.630 percent) were censored.  This result 
indicates that the majority of stocks are subject to short-selling constraints and that the actual 
shorting demand is higher than the observed short interest ratio.  
Among the return indicators in Table 7, both the return and the past month return were 
positively related to the shorting demand.  Therefore, short-selling is a contrarian sign, and 
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investors sell short to take advantage of potential price downturn or current overpricing.  The 
market-to-book ratio was negatively related to the shorting demand.  When the market-to-book 
ratio is high, the market has a high expectation of the earning power of the firm, which signifies 
that the stock price will increase in the future.  This information decreases the demand for 
shorting.   
The differences of opinion proxies indicated different impacts on the shorting demand.  
The analyst forecast dispersion variable indicated that, when there is a discrepancy in the 
security values, the investors become less likely to short.  This phenomenon can be associated 
with higher shorting costs and more trading risks because when the stock value is unclear, the 
borrowing costs and the probability of premature short squeeze risk are higher.  Similarly, the 
past 12-month return volatility variable displayed a negative coefficient of -0.1743, indicating 
that the short-sellers were more reluctant to sell short when there was more disagreement about 
the stock intrinsic value in the recent period.  Because short sales are riskier than the long 
position, a volatile market makes short-sellers cautious.   
However, the stock trading volumes in both the current and past periods showed a clearly 
positive relationship.  This positive relationship was exactly opposite from the negative 
implication given by the other proxies for valuation controversy (i.e., analyst forecast dispersion 
and the past 12-month return volatility), implying that if investors disagree about the intrinsic 
value of the stocks, they tend to sell short less.  This contradiction can be explained by the proxy 
role of turnover.  Turnover is more of a proxy for liquidity rather than for the valuation 
controversy among investors.  Consequently, the positive relationship between turnover and 
shorting demand makes sense.  More liquid stocks cost less to short and, ceteris paribus, increase 
the shorting demand.  Our results on turnover also matched with the previous finding of both 
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Datar et al. (1998) and Brennan et al. (1998) that stocks with high trading volume have low 
future returns.  Thus, higher turnover can trigger an increased demand to short.  Therefore, even 
though turnover can reflect both liquidity and differences of opinion, our study indicates that it 
predominantly plays the former role.   
 The liquidity factor (LIQ) is a measure that was described in a Sadka (2006) paper.  It is 
defined as the price-impact induced by trades and is separated into fixed (transitory) and variable 
(permanent) price effects.  The permanent change in the stock price is associated with a change 
in its perceived intrinsic value through the information effect and is dependent on the amounts of 
both informed and noise trading.  LIQ has a positive effect on the shorting demand.  When it is 
more likely that the pessimistic information will be permanently embedded into the stock price, 
the shorting demand increases.  This effect implies that short-sellers are informed traders.  They 
tend to catch the correct timing to short and avoid short squeeze risk.  In the risk perspective, 
when there is less noise trading in the market, short sales are less risky, and the shorting demand 
increases.  Size has a quadratic effect on the shorting demand.  The shorting demand increases 
for the stocks of large firms, as large firm stocks typically attract more attention in the media and 
reduce the information asymmetry.  At the same time, large firm stocks are typically more liquid, 
as more institutional investors hold them.  Consequently, it is easier and less costly for investors 
to find stock loans for large firm stocks and sell them short.  However, when the firm size is very 
large, the shorting demand decreases.  One possible reason for this phenomenon is that a very 
large firm typically has a high market price, which increases the costs to short (such as the 
margin requirement). 
 The option market (both call and put) facilitates short sales.  Stocks that are call or put 
option-enabled are more likely to boost the short sales.  This result is also supported by evidence 
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from Figlewski and Webb (1993) that optioned stocks are more heavily shorted than non-
optioned stocks.  They explain this phenomenon by stating that when a put is purchased from an 
option maker, the market maker will normally hedge by shorting the stock and/or buying a call to 
reverse the position.  Diether et al. (2008) provided additional evidence for this explanation for 
the call option.  Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) also found that, not only do call-only option 
listings increase the short interest, but joint put-call listings produce greater increases in short 
interest.  This finding matches the observations from our study.  From the liquidity perspective, 
stocks with an active option market should also have an active stock market; both of these 
features indicate a more liquid market for trading and an easier environment for shorting.  
 
6.3. Short-selling Constraints 
 
 After we estimate the latent shorting demand, the difference between the realizable and 
the realized shorting demand yield a new proxy for short-selling constraints.   
 Figure 2 indicates the monthly median values of the short interest ratio (SIR), 
institutional ownership (IOS), realizable shorting demand (SID), and short-selling constraints 
(SC).  The realizable shorting demand is the censored predicted values from the pooled interval 
regression model.  They are left censored at the short interest ratio when they are smaller than the 
lower bound, and right censored at the institutional ownership when they are greater than the 
upper bound.  The short-selling constraints (SC) were derived as the difference of the latent 
shorting demand and the realized shorting demand, in other words, the difference between the 
predicted realizable shorting demand (SID) and the short interest ratio (SIR).  Because the option 
data were all missing before September, 1995, the predicted shorting demand and the short-
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selling constraints data start at September, 1995.  Over the entire period, the short-selling 
constraints remained at a stable level, even from 1995 to 2000, when institutional holding 
fluctuated greatly and after 2000, when the market shares of the institutional investors increased 
dramatically.  This result indicates that the stock supply is only one of the factors that impact 
short-selling activities and that most of the times it is not binding.  The mean and median of the 
predicted realizable shorting demand with censoring are 0.2333 and 0.2315.  The short-selling 
constraints have a mean of 0.1861 and a median of 0.1982.  Clearly, most of the shorting demand 
was suppressed for some reason, and only a small fraction of the actual shorting demand was 
realized.  This finding matches with the suggestion of the literature that short interest has been 
unbelievably low over time.  
 
VII. Short-selling Constraints and Momentum Abnormal Returns 
 
 After deriving the short-selling constraints (SC), this section presents tests of Hypotheses 
1-2, which predict that stocks with more severe short-selling constraints generate lower returns.  
Hence, short-selling constraints can explain the abnormal returns in the loser portfolio from the 
momentum strategy, which also constitute the majority of the total momentum abnormal returns.  
 
7.1. Portfolio Sorts on Short-selling Constraints 
 In Table 8, the stocks are sorted at the end of each month t into three short-selling 
constraints groups.  As indicated by Panel A, strong variation is seen in short-selling constraints 
across the three groups.  The time-series averages of the cross-sectional means and medians of 
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short-selling constraints monotonically increase from a mean of 0.1281 and a median of 0.1438 
in the low group to a mean of 0.2329 and a median of 0.2260 in the high group.   
 In Panels B-H, we double-sort the portfolio by the short-selling constraints (SC), 
conditional on the independent sort of market-to-book ratio (MB), size (logSZ), past 12-month 
return volatility (VOL), analyst forecast dispersion (ADISP), turnover (TURN), call open interest 
(CALL), and put open interest (PUT).  At the end of each month, a portfolio is formed based on 
a double-sorting of the past 6 months’ mean values of the above variables, with a holding period 
of six months.  Hence, the holding periods are overlapping and one sixth of the portfolio is 
rebalanced every month, as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).  Returns in each portfolio are 
equally weighted and they are reported in decimal points per month.  
 Panel B presents the MB results.  As the market-to-book ratio increases, the stock returns 
decrease in all subgroups within the same level of the short-selling constraints.  This finding 
indicates that glamour stocks tend to sell at relatively high price-to-earnings ratios, and thus, they 
tend to earn smaller returns relative to value stocks.  Within each subgroup sorted on the market-
to-book ratio, stocks with stronger short-selling constraints tend to be more overpriced and earn 
smaller returns.  For example, in the subgroup with a low market-to-book ratio, the most short-
selling constrained group earns a low return of only 1.29% and the much higher return of 1.88% 
in the least short-selling constrained group.  This difference is significant at the 5% level, after 
controlling for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  Hypothesis I predicts that stocks that are 
most constrained by the short-selling risk generate the smallest returns.  As indicated by the table, 
this prediction is borne out remarkably well.  More importantly, the prediction holds when the 
market-to-book ratio (a factor that is widely believed to affect stock returns) is controlled at 
different levels.  Therefore, the explanatory power of the short-selling constraints is valid and 
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independent of the market-to-book ratio in explaining the cross-sectional stock return 
predictability.   
The strikingly similar pattern we see in the MB results also appears in other predictors.  
Panel C demonstrates the return patterns based on double-sorting according to the firm size and 
the short-selling constraints.  Even after sorting by the firm size, the stock returns still clearly 
decrease as the short-selling constraints increase.  The stock return in the SC1 group is only 1.15% 
for the low firm size group, and reaches as high as 1.48% for the least constrained group.  This 
pattern reinforces Hypothesis 1 that the stocks that are most constrained by the short-selling risk 
generate the lowest returns.  Short-selling constraints still show an independent power for 
explaining the cross-sectional return variations, after controlling for the size effects.   
Panel D also displays a very similar pattern as the previous return predictors.  When the 
past 12-month return volatility data are sorted, short-selling constraints still cause the stock 
returns to decrease across the SC groups.  For example, when the past return volatility is high, 
the stock return drops from 1.17% in the SC3 group (the least constrained group) to 0.37% in the 
SC1 group (the most constrained group).  This drop is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
This finding further supports Hypothesis 1 that the more short-selling constrained stocks are 
subject to more overpricing and tend to provide lower returns.  Therefore, when the stock market 
is more volatile or there is more controversy about the intrinsic value of a stock in the past, the 
short-sellers tend to be more reluctant to sell short to avoid more risk, which translates into more 
overpriced stocks and lower stock returns.  Therefore, past return volatility and short-selling 
constraints have individual explanatory powers in stock return variations.    
 Panel E reports the stock return variations after a double-sorting of the analyst forecast 
dispersion and the short-selling constraints.  This panel is important because it directly tests the 
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long-debated hypothesis proposed by Miller (1977) that short-selling constraints in a market of 
heterogeneous beliefs will cause stock overpricing.  However, stocks with the highest degree of 
heterogeneous beliefs did not display the largest return differences when the short-selling 
constraints increased from the lowest group to the highest.  In the group with the most 
heterogeneous beliefs (the P1 group), the stock returns showed a clearly increasing pattern as the 
short-selling constraints decreased.  Therefore, stocks with more short-selling constraints were 
possibly overpriced, even after controlling for the extent of heterogeneous beliefs in the market, 
which is consistent with Hypothesis 1.  Furthermore, this pattern exists in other groups with 
different levels of valuation controversy.  
 Panel F indicates that Hypothesis 1 is still very significant when the portfolio is double-
sorted by turnover and short-selling constraints.  The stock return in SC1 is lower than that in 
SC3, given the same level of stock turnover.  For example, given a low level of turnover, the 
stock return is 1.08% in the most short-selling constrained group but is as large as 1.53% in the 
least constrained group.      
 Panels G and H again indicate the persistent and independent explanatory power of short-
selling constraints in predicting cross-sectional stock returns.  As predicted by Hypothesis 1, the 
stocks that are most severely short-selling constrained earn the lowest return in all the subgroups 
ranked by call (put) open interest.  For instance, the stocks with high call or put open interest 
earned a return of 0.96% in Panel G and 0.95% in Panel H in the most short-selling constrained 
group.  However, they earned as high as 1.70% in Panel G and 1.52% in Panel H when they were 
in the least short-selling constrained group.   
  Therefore, the above double-sorting analysis demonstrates a clear and strong pattern that 
stock returns decrease as short-selling constraints become more severe while holding one of the 
100 
 
controlling variables constant.  This cross-sectional variation verifies the first hypothesis that the 
stocks that are most constrained by short-selling risk generate the lowest returns.  Short-selling 
constraints have a strong and independent explanatory power for predicting cross-sectional stock 
returns.  
 
7.2. Momentum Strategy and Short-selling Constraints  
 
 Now we investigate the momentum returns from the loser portfolio and a modified 
momentum strategy directly.   
Table 9 displays monthly returns to a modified momentum strategy based on a single 
sorting of the past 6 months’ short-selling constraints (SC), instead of the past returns in Panel A, 
and a double-sorting of the short-selling constraints, conditional on the past 6 months’ returns in 
Panel B.  Panel A shows a strongly increasing pattern in the stock returns as the short-selling 
constraints decrease.  Therefore, short-selling constraints offer predictability for stock returns.  
This is consistent with Hypothesis 1 that stocks with more short-selling constraints are more 
overpriced and thus predict lower returns.  The stocks in Panel A in the SC1 group generated a 
low return of 0.82%, which gradually increased to 1.40% in the least short-selling constrained 
group.  The raw return in this modified momentum strategy was 0.58%.  
In Panel B, the momentum strategy first ranks the stocks based on the past 6 months’ 
geometric returns.  The stocks with the highest past returns were the winners, and those with the 
lowest past returns were the losers.  According to Hypothesis 1, within the loser portfolio, further 
sorting on short-selling constraints should still have independent explanatory power in the 
portfolio returns.  Panel B indicates a strong return pattern not only in the loser portfolio but also 
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in the other return groups.  The stocks in the most short-selling constrained group provided the 
lowest returns.  In the loser portfolio, the most short-selling constrained stocks only earned an 
average of 0.77%, which increased to 1.32% when the short-selling constraints were mildest.  
This finding directly supports Hypothesis 1 that short-selling constraints do cause the return 
predictability in the momentum strategy, even after controlling for past returns.    
 
7.3. Risk Adjustments 
 
 Table 10 provides insights on the sources of abnormal returns from the momentum 
strategy.  Specifically, it explores the importance of short-selling constraints for generating the 
abnormal returns from the momentum strategy.  In this table, four models are compared to 
explain the momentum abnormal returns: the well-established Fama-French three-factor model, 
our modified four-factor model with short-selling constraints included as the additional factor, 
the Carhart four-factor model, and our modified five-factor model with short-selling constraints 
as the fifth factor.  The Fama-French three-factor model is recognized as the most efficient and 
powerful model for explaining the cross-sectional variation of average stock returns.  If our 
modified four-factor model significantly improves the explanatory power of the three-factor 
model, then the fourth factor does capture the additional variation of the portfolio returns that is 
missed by the three-factor model.  Similarly, if short-selling constraints (SC) variable is added 
into the Carhart four-factor model and keeps significant with the presence of momentum factor, 
then short-selling constraints (SC) does have additional explanatory power that supplements the 
momentum factor in explaining the returns from the momentum strategy.   
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First, we run the following time-series regression using the monthly portfolio returns 
from the momentum strategy, in excess of risk-free rate in Panel A: = ∗
∗ ∗ .	 Here,  is the monthly average portfolio returns;  is 
the monthly Treasury bill rate (i.e., the risk-free interest rate) obtained from WRDS,  
(MKTRF) is the monthly Fama-French excess return on the market, SMB is the monthly Fama-
French small firm factor, and HML is the monthly Fama-French book-to-market (value) factor.  
The momentum strategy is a (6,0,6) strategy, which sorts the portfolio based on the past 6 month 
returns and holds the portfolio for 6 months without skipping.  P0 represent the returns from the 
winner portfolio, P2 represent the returns from the loser portfolio, and P0-P2 represents the 
return differences between the winner and loser portfolios (i.e., the total momentum returns).  
 In all of the return groups, only two of the estimated intercept coefficients from these 
regressions are significantly different from zero.  The explanatory power of the Fama-French 
three-factor model is highest in the winner portfolio, with an adjusted R-square as high as 
91.86%.  The explanatory power of the model decrease to 69.41% in the loser portfolio.  The 
total momentum return is least explained by the three-factor model at 10.05%.  Clearly the three-
factor model explains the winner stocks much better than the loser stocks, probably because it 
was unable to catch some risk factor that affected the loser stocks predominantly.  Two variables 
were consistently significant in the three-factor model.  One was MKTRF, the market excess 
returns, and the other was SMB, which mimics return for the size factor.  These results indicate 
that the market risk and size difference across firms do capture strong common variation in stock 
returns.    
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 To investigate the additional explanatory power of short-selling constraints beyond the 
well-established Fama-French three factors, Panel B runs the same Fama-French three-factor 
model as above but includes short-selling constraints (SC) as an additional factor.  The short-
selling constraints (SC) were constructed largely following the Carhart (1997) method for 
obtaining the momentum factor, which was calculated as the return difference of the 3 equally-
weighted portfolios formed by sorting the past six months’ short-selling constraints.  The 
portfolios were reformed monthly.  
 As with the three-factor model, the explanatory power of the four-factor model also 
decreased from the winner portfolio to the loser portfolio and was lowest in the total momentum 
return portfolio.  It is not surprising that the three-factor model had low explanatory power in the 
total momentum return portfolio because it was the model for cross-sectional stock returns.  
However, the most revealing phenomenon was that, while the adjusted R-squares for the winner 
and intermediate portfolios stay almost unchanged in the four-factor model, the explanatory 
power of the four-factor model for the loser portfolio increased by 8%, from 69.41% to 77.42%, 
after the short-selling constraints factor was added in.  Furthermore, the short-selling constraints 
factor was very significant in the loser portfolio at the 1% level but was not significant in the 
winner and intermediate portfolios.  These results clearly verify our previous understanding that 
the short-selling constraint is a risk factor that predominantly affects the loser portfolio.  The 
modified four-factor model with short-selling constraints does capture additional risk loading 
that the well-established Fama-French three-factor model was unable to pick up.  The four-factor 
model also greatly increased the explanatory power in the total momentum returns, from 10.05% 
to 31.78%.  These 21% increase of the adjusted R-square strongly indicated again that the short-
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selling constraints factor in our modified four-factor model captured additional risk loading and 
better explained the momentum abnormal returns.    
 The Carhart four-factor model was also compared with our five-factor model with short-
selling constraints added in as the fifth explaining factor.  The Carhart four-factor model greatly 
increased the explaining power of the Fama-French three-factor model.  It explained the 
momentum returns much better than the three-factor model and raised the adjusted R-square 
from 10.05% to as high as 84.90%.  The fourth factor, the momentum factor, was also highly 
significant in all of the regressions.  When the short-selling constraints (SC) were added in, the 
explaining power of the five model still increased; however, the increase was small 
(approximately 1%).  More interestingly, even with the presence of the momentum factor, the 
short-selling constraint variable was still significant in the loser portfolio regression and the 
momentum return regression.  The significance level of the momentum factor also decreased 
considerably, which may imply that some of the explanatory power in the momentum factor was 
absorbed by the short-selling constraints.  This result indicates that the short-selling constraints 
have independent explanatory power and can capture some risk loading that the momentum 
factor does not capture.  Also, the loser portfolio stocks are much more sensitive than the 
winners in to reflecting such risk loading.    
 All of these model comparisons indicate that the short-selling constraint has persistent 
and independent explanatory power for explaining the returns from the momentum strategy.   
 A new proxy for the short-squeeze risk was also developed and added into the Fama-
French three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model.  The short-squeeze risk has proxies 
in four different measures.  SIR/(IOS-SIR) and SIR/(1-SIR) measure the ratio of short interest 
and available stock loans.  When the ratios are small, the availability of the loanable stocks is 
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higher, so the short squeeze risk is lower.  The difference in the denominator of these two 
measures represents the difference between the stock loans available in the whole market and the 
proportion that is provided by the institutional investors.  The results of adding in the short-
squeeze risk to the Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model were 
similar for both of the two measures, indicating that the institutional investors are indeed the 
major providers of the loanable stocks for short sales.  The other group of proxies are (IOS-
SIR)/SIR and (1-SIR)/SIR, to include the situation when short interest ratio is larger than or 
equal to the institutional ownership.  These two proxies produce similar results to the previous 
two proxies.  To save space, only the proxy of SIR/(IOS-SIR) results are presented here in Table 
11.  It should be noted that when IOS is used in the proxy, the explanatory power of the modified 
Fama-French three-factor model with short squeeze risk included as the fourth factor greatly 
increases.  However, if the total number of shares outstanding was used, no improvement was 
observed when the short squeeze risk was added in the Fama-French three-factor model.  Results 
for the short-squeeze risk were very similar to the short-selling constraints variable.  Both the 
modified Fama-French three-factor model and the modified Carhart model better explain the 
momentum returns.  The short-squeeze risk also shows independent explanatory power by 
remaining significant in the presence of the Fama-French three factors and the momentum factor.  
However, the only difference is that the short-squeeze risk does not show an asymmetric feature 






7.4. NASDAQ Effect 
 
 Some previous studies have noticed the phenomenon in the momentum strategy that 
including NASDAQ stocks in the portfolio decreases returns from the momentum strategy.  
Table 12 compares the returns from the momentum strategies with and without NASDAQ stocks.  
The momentum strategy in this table was formed based on the past-six-month returns, then held 
for six months without skip.  The portfolio was equally divided into ten groups, with P0 as the 
winner portfolio with the highest return during the past six months and P10 as the loser portfolio 
with the lowest return during the past six months.   
In Panel A, the stocks in the pooled interval regression model are included.  When the 
NASDAQ stocks are included in the momentum strategy, the loser portfolio return increases 
from 1.89% to 2.26%.  However, the winner portfolio was not affected by the inclusion of 
NASDAQ stocks, and the return for the winner portfolio only differed by a negligible amount of 
0.05%.  The returns of P1-P10 in the momentum strategy with only NYSE and AMEX stocks 
was 0.37%, and this number dropped to 0.05% when the NASDAQ stocks were included.  This 
0.32% drop in P0-P10 came mostly from the return increase in the loser portfolio.  In Panel B, 
when all of the stocks in the market are included, the above trend is more obvious.  In the second 
column, the loser portfolio obtained a 0.87% return, and this return increased as high as 1.53% 
when NASDAQ stocks were included.  This increase of 0.66% was statistically significant at the 
1% level.  In addition, the P0-P10 yielded 0.78% in the momentum strategy with only NYSE and 
AMEX stocks, which was also statistically significant at 1%.  However, P0-P10 dropped to only 
0.32% when NASDAQ stocks were included, and this drop of 0.46% was very close to being 
significant at the 10% level.  More importantly, this large drop in the momentum returns again 
was mostly due to the increase of returns from the loser portfolio.    
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 In sum, we find that the decrease of the momentum raw return comes mostly from the 
increase of the loser portfolio returns, as the winner portfolio returns remained relatively stable.  
Furthermore, in both panels, the loser portfolio returns increased when the NASDAQ stocks 
were included.  It is not a simple coincidence.  Because the stocks in the NASDAQ are subject to 
less severe short-selling constraints, and thus the pessimistic information can be quickly reflected 
in the price, the stock returns become higher in the loser portfolio.  To verify Hypothesis 3, Table 
13 directly investigates the level of short-selling constraints among stocks in the NASDAQ and 
the NYSE & AMEX.   
 First, t-tests were calculated on the characteristics of the two groups of stocks according 
to where they are traded.  In Table 13, NASDAQ stocks have a mean of 1.97% short interest 
ratio, whereas NYSE & AMEX stocks have an average of 2.85% short interest ratio.  The short 
interest ratio difference between the two groups was 0.88%, which is significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level.  Therefore, NASDAQ stocks generally have a lower short interest ratio 
relative to NYSE & AMEX stocks.  However, even though NASDAQ stocks have smaller short 
interest ratios, they are less short-selling constrained.  According to the t-test on the variable SC, 
an average of 16.48% of shares outstanding are short-selling constrained for NASDAQ stocks, 
which is 3.78% less than the stocks listed on NYSE & AMEX.  This difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  It can be partially explained by the finding in the Reg. SHO Pilot 
Report (2007) that the bid test in the NASDAQ was less restrictive than the tick test in the NYSE.   
An OLS regression was also run in Panel B, with short-selling constraints as a dependent 
variable and the indicator variable NASDAQ as the only independent variable.  NASDAQ is a 
binary variable which takes the value one when the stocks are traded in the NASDAQ and 
otherwise takes the value zero.  The regression result further verifies our conclusion from the t-
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tests from Panel A.  Comparing to the stocks traded in the NYSE and AMEX, stocks traded in 
the NASDAQ are subject to 3.74% fewer short-selling constraints.  This result is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
Therefore, traders in the NASDAQ market encounter fewer constraints on short sales.  
This factor allows pessimistic information to flow more easily for the NASDAQ stocks than for 
the NYSE & AMEX stocks, which causes the NASDAQ losers to have higher returns in the 
momentum strategy relative to the losers in the NYSE & AMEX markets. 
 
7.5. Reg. SHO Pilot Program 
 
In July 2004, the SEC adopted Regulation SHO, which allows the commission to 
establish a pilot program to examine the efficacy of the tick and bid tests on short sales in the 
NYSE & AMEX and NASDAQ markets.  The pilot program exempted one-third of the stocks in 
the Russell 3000 Index from all price restrictions at any time, which were named as category A 
stocks in the July 28, 2004 pilot order and the “pilot” stocks in our study.  The control stocks are 
category B and C stocks in the remainder of the Russell 3000 Index.  Category B stocks are 
exempted from the price tests from 4:15 pm until the open of the consolidated tape the next day 
only.  Category C stocks have no price tests only from the close of the consolidated tape until the 
open of the consolidated tape the next day.  Stocks that exist both in the pre-pilot and pilot period 
for at least one month, and are in the regression data in Table 14, are included for comparison in 
the later analysis.  Because the NASDAQ market has a more favorable short-selling environment 
than does the NYSE & AMEX markets from Hypothesis 3, this analysis was conducted 
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separately for both the listed and the NASDAQ stocks.  This distinction also helps distinguish 
the effects of the tick test in the NYSE & AMEX and the bid test in the NASDAQ.  
According to the SEC’s pilot order, the SEC first excluded 32 stocks that were neither 
listed in the NYSE & AMEX nor in the NASDAQ, along with IPOs or spin-offs stocks 
commenced after April 30, 2004 from the 2004 Russell 3000.  Category A stocks were then 
selected by sorting the 2004 Russell 3000 first by the listing market and then by the average 
daily dollar volume from June, 2003 through May, 2004, and then within each listing market, 
picking every third company starting with the second (Reg. SHO Pilot Report, 2007).   
 Table 14 provides the summary statistics of the monthly stock characteristics between the 
pilot and control samples over the four-month period prior to the start of the pilot program on 
May 2, 2005.  The data are reported separately in the NYSE & AMEX and the NASDAQ 
markets to capture the market differences.  Our sample contains 384 listed pilot stocks and 376 
listed control stocks in the NYSE & AMEX markets, and 759 pilot stocks and 826 control stocks 
in the NASDAQ market.  In the listed market, the pilot and control stocks have similar turnover 
ratios, short-interest ratios, short-selling constraints, and market-to-book ratios from January, 
2005 to April, 2005 (before the initiation of the pilot program).  In the NASDAQ market, the 
pilot and control stocks have comparable turnover ratios, short-selling constraints, and market-
to-book ratios prior to the pilot program, except for the short interest ratios.  According to the 
two-sample t-test, the pilot group in NASDAQ has a 0.9% greater short-interest ratio than the 
control group before the start of the pilot program.  Overall, at large, the pilot and control stocks 
were comparable in both markets over the pre-pilot period and support the validity of further 
comparison over the pilot period.   
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 Two kinds of t-tests were used to determine the efficacy of the price tests.  Within both 
the pilot and control samples, paired t-tests were applied to compare the stock characteristics 
before and after the pilot program within each sample.  The means of the stock characteristics, 
such as the short interest ratio, short-selling constraints, turnover ratio, and market-to-book ratio 
were first calculated separately over the pre-pilot and pilot periods in different markets for both 
samples.  Then, paired t-tests on the different stock characteristics in the different markets were 
calculated to detect changes due to the removal of the price tests.  However, this paired t-test 
method cannot distinguish the effects of market conditions or the time trend over the pre-pilot 
and pilot periods from the efficacy of the price tests.  To address that concern, two-sample t-tests 
were run on the difference of the differences between the pilot and control samples in both 
markets.  As long as the pilot and control samples are generally well-constructed, this approach 
can control for changes in the market conditions or the time trend that are unrelated to the 
removal of price tests.     
 Table 15 reports the results of the comparison between pilot and control stocks using the 
above two types of t-tests.  In the pilot sample, the listed stocks increase their short-selling 
constraints by 0.28% from 21.94% to 22.22%, at a significance level of 5%, after the tick test is 
removed.  However, the pilot stocks in the NASDAQ exhibit no significant change of short-
selling constraints after the removal of the bid test.  This finding once again provides support for 
our previous finding that the NASDAQ provides a better environment for short transactions and 
that the bid test does not pose effective hindrance to short sales in the NASDAQ market.  Similar 
results are seen in the control sample.  While the listed control stocks indicated an increase in 
short-selling constraints after the pilot program, the short-selling constraint level of the control 
sample in the NASDAQ market kept stable.  However, an increase in the short-selling constraint 
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level in both samples of the listed market only exhibited a time trend over the one-year study 
period.  The difference of differences shown in the last column of Table 15 indicates that, in both 
markets, the short-selling constraints of the pilot and control stocks are similar before and after 
the pilot program, after eliminating the market condition changes over the one-year study period.  
This result clearly suggests that price tests are not effective measures in posing constraints on 
short sales.  Several reasons can be attributed to this observation. (1) The price restrictions are 
applied to some markets but not in others, so while trading the same stocks, traders can avoid the 
price restrictions by choosing a venue where the restrictions are not applied.  For example, 
because not all markets that trade NASDAQ stocks apply the bid test, short-sellers can route 
their orders to avoid the price restriction (Reg. SHO Pilot Report, 2007).  This factor may 
explain our result that the short interest ratio is negatively impacted by the removal of price tests 
in both markets.  In the NASDAQ market, the short interest of the control stocks increased by 
0.53% relative to the pilot stocks (at a significance level of 1%), suggesting that some short-
sellers are routing orders to avoid the bid test.  A similar negative impact on the short interest is 
also observed for the NYSE & AMEX markets from the results of the difference in differences.  
(2) Investors can still sell short after the restricted trading time for control stocks or by 
converting to limit orders.   
 In addition, the short interests for the pilot sample in the NASDAQ market, and for the 
control samples in both markets, increased over the pilot period.  This increase in short sales over 
the one-year period could be a combination of the market conditions and an increase of public 
awareness through the media.   
 As a whole, because price restrictions were not effective in controlling short sales, there 
is no regulation benefits associated with them, but only regulation burdens.  Therefore, our study 
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conditionally supports the SEC’s decision to abolish the tick and bid rules.  However, several 
papers, such as Bai (2007) and Shkilko et al. (2008) have mentioned that, even if the price tests 
are not effective under normal market conditions, they may be meaningful under abnormal 





 The evidence presented in our study suggests that short-selling constraints play a very 
important role in explaining the source of momentum abnormal returns, which directly 
challenges the efficiency market hypothesis.  We argue that the predictable return from the loser 
portfolio, which is also the major contributor of the momentum abnormal returns, arises from the 
short-selling constraints.  After constructing a new proxy for short-selling constraints, we found 
that, consistent with the above argument, stocks that are mostly short-selling constrained 
generate the lowest returns, even after controlling for the other stock characteristics that are 
traditionally believed to determine stock returns, such as the market-to-book ratio, turnover ratio, 
past return volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, call (put) open interest, and firm size.  This 
return prediction in the momentum strategy supports the mispricing explanation that stocks with 
more severe short-selling constraints prevent pessimistic information from being quickly 
released into the stock price, causing those stocks to be overpriced.  These results also support 
Miller’s (1977) hypothesis that stocks are overpriced in the presence of short-selling constraints 
and heterogeneous beliefs. 
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 The short-selling constraints also explain the momentum abnormal returns from the loser 
portfolio strongly and independently.  When added into the Fama-French three-factor model, 
which is well known as one of the best models for explaining cross-sectional stock returns, our 
modified four-factor model still significantly improved the explanatory power of the three-factor 
model in the loser portfolio and in the total momentum return portfolio.  Therefore, the short-
selling constraint is a risk factor that predominantly affects the loser portfolio and captures 
additional risk loading that the well-established Fama-French three-factor model does not detect. 
 Our study also explained the long-observed puzzle in the momentum literature that when 
NASDAQ stocks are included in the momentum strategy, the momentum abnormal returns 
reduce drastically.  We found that the short-selling constraints were the key reason to explain this 
well-known puzzle.  NASDAQ stocks are less severely short-selling constrained relative to 
stocks in the NYSE & AMEX markets.  Therefore, NASDAQ stocks have less of an overpricing 
problem and generate higher returns in the momentum loser portfolio.     
 Using the new proxy for short-selling constraints, we also provided more supporting 
evidence to abolish the price tests in both markets under normal market conditions because they 
are not effective in controlling short sales.  However, the necessity of price tests in an abnormal 
market, such as a market crisis, should be further explored.  
 We also derived interesting inferences about the determinants of short-selling demand.  
We found that short sales are constraint signs.  Investors tend to short when the current or past 
return indicators are high.  At the same time, investors are rational and informed traders in short 
sales.  They tend to sell short more when there is less risk and less valuation controversy present 
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Figure 1. SIR and IOS 
Line plots of the median SIR, IOS and the 95th percentile SIR 
SIR (short interest ratio) is the monthly short interest ratio, calculated as the number of shares 
shorted divided by the monthly outstanding shares.  IOS (institutional ownership ratio) is the 
monthly ratio of institutional ownership with stock splits for late filing adjusted, scaled by shares 
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Figure 2. Short-selling Constraints 
Line plots of median short interest ratio (SIR), institutional ownership (IOS), predicted realizable 
shorting demand (SID), and the short selling constraints (SC).  SIR is the monthly short interest 
ratio, calculated as the number of shares shorted divided by the monthly outstanding shares.  IOS 
is the monthly ratio of institutional ownership with stock splits for late filling adjusted scaled by 
shares outstanding.  SID is the predicted realizable shorting demand estimated from the pooled 
interval regression.  SC is calculated as the difference between the realizable shorting demand 
(SID) and the short interest ratio (SIR).  The sample period runs from January 1988 to December 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of  short interest ratio, institutional ownership ratio and firm characteristics  
Panel A reports the monthly time-series averages of equally-weighted cross-sectional means and standard deviations of the variables 
used in the analysis.  MB is market to book ratio; ADISP (analyst forecast dispersion) is the standard deviation of analysts’ EPS 
forecasts in I/B/E/S, scaled by the absolute means of forecasts; TURN (turnover) is the monthly trading volume scaled by shares 
outstanding and divided by two for Nasdaq stocks; IOS (institutional ownership ratio) is the monthly ratio of institutional ownership 
with stock splits for late filling adjusted scaled by shares outstanding; VOL (volatility) is the standard deviation of monthly individual 
stock returns for the past 12 months; logSZ is the monthly natural log of market capitalization.  CALL (PUT) is the total call (put) 
option contracts for a particular stock scaled by thousands of shares outstanding.  LIQ is the yearly Sadka permanent variable liquidity 
factor.  SIR is the monthly short interest ratio, calculated as the number of shares shorted divided by the monthly outstanding shares.  
Panel B reports monthly time-series averages of cross-sectional correlations17.  The sample period runs from January 1988 to 
December 2005.   
                                                   LIQ         MB        ADSIP     VOL     TURN      RET      logSZ      CALL      PUT       SIR         IOS     
Panel A: means & standard deviations 
Mean      0.0006    5.3154      0.1668    0.1489    0.0741    0.0179   19.0324    0.1311    0.0813   0.0289    0.3650 
Median    0.0008    2.0513      0.0364    0.1191    0.0422    0.0039   18.8862    0.0482    0.0218   0.0059    0.3212 
Standard Deviation                  0.0037  103.8564    0.9648    0.1183    0.1895    0.1919    2.0707     0.3223    0.2484   0.1583    0.2810 
Firms per month (average)        3414       2912         1996       3419       3437       3423       3423        1297       1284      3446       3437  
 
Panel B: cross-sectional correlations                                                       
MB                                                                     -0.0051    0.0982    0.1050   0.0249     0.0678     0.0909    0.0864   0.0406    0.0166 
ADSIP                                                                                     0.1039    0.0076  -0.0118    -0.0975    0.0149    0.0128  -0.0006   -0.0592 
VOL                                                                                                       0.2267   0.0772    -0.3098    0.1919    0.1236   0.0327   -0.2209 
TURN                                                                                                                  0.0944     0.1987  0.4454    0.4055   0.2103    0.2455 
RET                                                 0.0446     0.0192    0.0241   0.0085    0.0041 
logSZ                   0.0783    0.1251   0.1263    0.6625 
CALL                  0.8367   0.5697    0.0000 
PUT                                0.5487    0.0361 
SIR                                                                                                                                                                                              0.1746 
                                                 
17 LIQ is not included in Panel B, because it is the same for all the stocks in the market for a given year.  
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of SIR and IOS 
Summary statistics of  short interest ratio, institutional ownership ratio and firm characteristics 
for two groups: SIR  IOS and SIR> IOS.  SIR (short interest ratio) is the monthly short interest 
ratio, calculated as the number of shares shorted divided by the monthly outstanding shares.  IOS 
(institutional ownership ratio) is the monthly ratio of institutional ownership with stock splits for 
late filing adjusted, scaled by shares outstanding.  T-statistics for two-sample t-tests are reported 
in the parentheses.  The sample period runs from January 1988 to December 2005.  Significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, b and c, respectively.  
                SIR  IOS           SIR> IOS   
                     Median         Mean               Median          Mean            (t-statistics) 
SIR                         0.0060         0.0229              0.0059          0.1462             (-32.8842)a 
IOS                         0.3468         0.3836                   0              0.0496            (393.1767)a 
MB                         2.0535         5.2467              2.1857          7.6906             (-4.7686)a 
ADSIP                    0.0360         0.1653              0.0606          0.2586             (-6.9707)a 
VOL                       0.1169         0.1454              0.1673          0.2120             (-60.6771)a 
TURN                    0.0428         0.0729              0.0342           0.1011             (-7.6866)a 
RET                        0.0044         0.0176                  0               0.0234             (-3.4707)a 
LogSZ                   18.9869       19.1389            16.9501        17.2062            (179.2491)a 
CALL                     0.0477         0.1229              0.1242          0.6373             (-16.7423)a 
PUT                        0.0216         0.0763              0.0572          0.3850             (-14.1564)a 



























Table 7. Pooled Interval Regression 
Pooled interval regression analysis is run to estimate the latent shorting demand from January 
1988 to December 2005.  Dependent variable (SID) is the monthly realizable shorting demand, 
which always fall within the interval with the realized short interest ratio as the lower bound and 
institutional ownership as a conservative upper bound.  Explanatory variables are VOL, RET, 
lagRET, TURN, lagTURN, CALL, PUT, LIQ, logSZ, logSZSQ, MB and ADISP as defined in 
Table I.  The table reports the coefficient estimates with cluster robust error adjusted t-statistics.   
Variables    Coefficients   Robust Std. Err.        Z   P>|Z| 
RET        0.0137        0.0035                             3.91                  0.0000 
lagRET                 0.0144                          0.0036                            4.04                  0.0000 
MB                      -0.00002       5.57e-06                          -3.39                 0.0000 
logSZ                    0.2126                         0.0206                            10.30                 0.0000 
logSZSQ              -0.0049                         0.0005                          -10.35                 0.0000 
TURN        0.1360                         0.0187                             7.27                  0.0000 
lagTURN              0.0938                         0.0148                             6.34                  0.0000 
ADSIP                 -0.0025                         0.0007                            -3.34                 0.0001 
VOL       -0.1743                         0.0214                            -8.13                 0.0000 
CALL        0.0463                         0.0170                             2.73                  0.0060 
PUT                      0.0670                         0.0170                             3.95                  0.0000 
LIQ                       0.5752                         0.1588                             3.62                  0.0000 
_CONS                -2.0932                         0.2241                            -9.34                 0.0000 
Lnsigma               -2.5400                         0.0348                          -72.91                 0.0000 
Sigma                    0.0789                         0.0027              
Observation summary:                             1,787  (1.323%)    left-censored observations 
                                                               129212 (95.64%)     uncensored observations 
                                                                  4,117 (3.047%)    right-censored observations 
                                                         135116                   interval observations 
Measures of Fit for intreg of SIR, IOS 
Log-Lik Intercept Only:   -26515.249       Log-Lik Full Model:       -20263.578 
           Prob > LR:                       0.000 
















Table 8. Double Sorting 
Monthly cross-sectional returns based on the double sorting of short-selling constraints (SC), 
conditional on market-to-book ratio (MB), size (logSZ), past 12 month’s return volatility (VOL), 
analyst forecast dispersion (ADISP), turnover (TURN), call open interest (CALL), and put open 
interest (PUT)18.  At the end of each month t from January 1988 to December 2005, stocks are 
ranked by the past 6 month’s mean market-to-book ratio (Panel B), mean size (Panel C), mean 
past 12 month’s return volatility (Panel D), mean analyst forecast dispersion (Panel E), mean 
turnover (Panel F), mean call open interest (Panel G), and mean put open interest (Panel H).  
Later the portfolios are further intersected by the independent sorting on the past 6 month’s mean 
short-selling constraints.  All the sortings are in 3 groups.  Stocks are held in these portfolios for 
6 months, i.e., one-sixth of each portfolio is rebalanced each month.  The table presents equally-
weighted returns on these portfolios with heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics 
shown in parentheses following Kiefer and Bogelsang (2002).  Returns are reported in decimal 
points per month.  Significance at the 5% and 10% level is indicated by a and b, respectively.  
Panel A presents time-series averages of cross-sectional means and medians of short-selling 
constraints. 
       Short-selling Constraints (SC) 
      (High)             (Low)         SC3-SC1        (t-statistics) 
      SC1              SC2            SC3 
Panel A: firm characteristics by short-selling constraints groups 
Mean SC (percent) 0.2329  0.1972           0.1281             
Median SC (percent)  0.2260  0.1982           0.1438          
 
Panel B: double sorting on market-to-book (MB) 
P1           (High)  0.0037 0.0046            0.0123          0.0086           (3.3266)    
P2    0.0094 0.0101            0.0179           0.0085           (3.2480)  
P3           (Low)  0.0129 0.0164            0.0188           0.0059        (5.2035)a 
P3-P1     Raw   0.0092            0.0118            0.0065           0.0027           (-0.1236) 
   (t-statistics)             (1.9862)         (2.4281)         (2.8464)           
 
Panel C: double sorting on size (logSZ) 
P1           (High) 0.0086             0.0104            0.0147          0.0061          (2.0475) 
P2   0.0089  0.0078            0.0158          0.0069            (3.1632)  
P3           (Low) 0.0115             0.0140            0.0148          0.0033            (1.3880) 
P3-P1       Raw 0.0029             0.0036            0.0001         -0.0028            (0.0270) 
   (t-statistics)            (0.6638)          (0.5632)          (0.8008) 
 
Panel D: double sorting on past 12 months’ return volatility (VOL) 
P1           (High) 0.0037  0.0096            0.0142          0.0117            (5.3947)a 
P2   0.0102             0.0104            0.0164           0.0065            (3.6303)  
P3           (Low) 0.0102             0.0118            0.0165          0.0064         (3.1211)  
 
                                                 
18 LIQ is the market liquid risk and does not vary across firms.  Therefore, double sorting based on LIQ and 
shortcons is not necessary.   
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Table 8. (continued) 
     Short-selling Constraints (SC) 
     (High)             (Low)          SC3-SC1        (t-statistics) 
     SC1               SC2             SC3 
P3-P1       Raw 0.0065             0.0022            0.0023          0.0042            (4.3199)b 
   (t-statistics)             (1.9372)           (1.5289)        (-0.1441) 
 
Panel E: double sorting on analyst forecast dispersion (ADISP) 
P1           (High) 0.0097             0.0119            0.0160          0.0063             (2.4776)        
P2   0.0083  0.0089            0.0134          0.0051             (3.6919)  
P3           (Low) 0.0087  0.0109            0.0156           0.0069             (4.4186)b 
P3-P1       Raw           -0.0010            -0.0010          -0.0004          -0.0006             (1.2695) 
   (t-statistics)            (-0.7214)          (0.6081)         (-1.5217) 
 
Panel F: double sorting on turnover (TURN) 
P1           (High) 0.0060  0.0064  0.0174          0.0114             (4.0174)b 
P2   0.0099  0.0119  0.0144          0.0041             (2.3745) 
P3           (Low) 0.0108  0.0121  0.0153          0.0059             (3.9604)b 
P3-P1       Raw 0.0048  0.0057            -0.0021         -0.0054            (1.5371) 
   (t-statistics)             (1.9286)          (2.7553)           (0.3855) 
 
Panel G: double sorting on call open interest (CALL) 
P1           (High) 0.0096  0.0107  0.0170          0.0074             (3.2170)  
P2   0.0077  0.0100  0.0111          0.0034             (3.9165)b 
P3           (Low) 0.0092  0.0111  0.0138          0.0046             (2.4829) 
P3-P1       Raw           -0.0004             0.0004            -0.0032        -0.0028             (1.8872) 
   (t-statistics)            (-0.3591)         (-0.6187)          (-1.7219)        
 
Panel H: double sorting on put open interest (PUT) 
P1           (High) 0.0095  0.0099  0.0152          0.0057          (2.7121)  
P2   0.0079  0.0096  0.0149          0.0070             (4.3777)b 
P3           (Low) 0.0091  0.0119  0.0158          0.0067             (3.1467) 
P3-P1       Raw           -0.0004             0.0020             0.0006          0.0010             (0.5285) 














Table 9. Double Sorting of SC and RET 
Monthly returns to momentum strategy based on the double sorting of short-selling constraints 
(SC), conditional on past 6 months’ returns, and single sorting based on the short-selling 
constraints.  At the end of each month t from January 1988 to December 2005, stocks are single 
ranked by the past 6 month’s mean short-selling constraints in Panel A.  In Panel B, the 
portfolios are first sorted on the past 6 month’s geometric returns, and then are further intersected 
by the independent sorting on the past 6 month’s mean short-selling constraints.  All the sortings 
are in 3 groups.  Stocks are held in these portfolios for 6 months, i.e., one-sixth of each portfolio 
is rebalanced each month.  The table presents equally-weighted returns on these portfolios with 
heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics shown in parentheses following Kiefer 
and Bogelsang (2002).  Returns are reported in decimal points per month.  Significance at the 5% 
and 10% level is indicated by a and b, respectively.    
       Short-selling Constraints (SC) 
      (High)             (Low)          SC3-SC1        (t-statistics) 
      SC1              SC2            SC3 
Panel A: single sorting on short selling constraints (SC) 
    0.0082 0.0118            0.0140         0.0058            (2.3707)   
 
Panel B: double sorting on past 6 months’ returns (RET) 
P1           (High)  0.0095 0.0098            0.0188         0.0093            (3.3805)  
P2    0.0086 0.0096            0.0142          0.0056            (2.9428) 
P3           (Low)  0.0077 0.0120            0.0132          0.0055            (2.4810) 
P3-P1     Raw             -0.0087           -0.0022          -0.0056          0.0031            (0.8369) 
   (t-statistics)            (-0.7888)         (0.1262)        (-0.8863) 























Table 10. Factor Models 
OLS regressions are run from January 1988 to December 2005 to test the relationship between 
momentum returns and a measure of short-selling constraints (SC).  Dependent variable is the 
average monthly returns of the portfolios from the momentum strategy in excess of risk free rate.  
P0 represent the returns from the winner portfolio, P2 represent the returns from the loser 
portfolio, P0-P2 represents the return differences between the winner and loser portfolios.  Panel 
A shows the coefficient estimates of Fama-French three factor regression: = ∗
∗ ∗ .	  is the monthly average portfolio returns;   is the 
monthly Treasury bill rate (i.e. risk-free interest rate),  (MKTRF) is the monthly Fama-
French excess return on the market, SMB is the monthly Fama-French small firm factor, HML is 
the monthly Fama-French book-to-market (value) factor.  Panel B shows the coefficient 
estimates of the four factor model with three Fama-French factors and the short-selling 
constraints, SC.  Panel C shows the coefficient estimates of Carhart four factor model, with three 
Fama-French factors and momentum factor, MM.  Panel D shows the coefficient estimates of the 
five factor model with three Fama-French factors, momentum factor and the short-selling 
constraints, SC.  The table reports t-statistics, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
by using Kiefer and Bogelsang (2002) approach.  Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is 
indicated by a, b and c, respectively. 
           P0 (winners)           P1           P2 (losers)       P0-P2  
Panel A: Fama-French three factor regressions without short-selling constraints (SC) 
Intercept              0.0018       -0.0020            -0.0020                 0.0007 
    (t-statistics)             (1.4410)      (-1.6855)              (-0.5995)      (0.2228) 
SMB      0.6340                0.2610                   0.4510                   0.1880 
(t-statistics)            (20.2499)a      (7.2783)a            (5.0186)b      (1.6695) 
HML      0.1320                0.5250           0.2150         -0.0811 
(t-statistics)             (2.5964)      (8.6911)a            (1.9636)      (-0.5361) 
MKTRF      1.0870                1.1550                   1.5850         -0.4970 
(t-statistics)            (94.9521)a     (48.1666)a             (18.1756)a      (-5.2435)b 
Adj. R2                         91.86%                 88.47%                 69.41%                  10.05%    
 
Panel B: Fama-French three factor regressions with short-selling constraints (SC) added 
Intercept              0.0028      -0.0030            -0.0096               0.0093 
    (t-statistics)  (1.7719)     (-2.7022)           (-2.3215)                 (2.0388)  
SMB      0.7010                0.2010                  -0.0489         0.7600 
(t-statistics)            (14.2195)a     (3.8067)c           (-0.3240)                 (3.8313) 
HML      0.0806                0.5710           0.5930                   -0.5130        
(t-statistics)             (1.7257)    (10.3678)a            (5.3211)b      (-3.3698) 
MKTRF      1.1180                1.1270                   1.3550               -0.2350         
(t-statistics)            (83.2145)a    (28.8600)a           (28.7634)a              (-4.4497)c 
SC                               -0.1350                  0.1210                   0.9980  -1.1420 
    (t-statistics)            (-3.5589)              (3.0814)                 (8.5200)a               (-7.5398)a 





Table 10. (continued) 
           P0 (winners)           P1           P2 (losers)       P0-P2  
Panel C: Carhart four factor regressions without short-selling constraints (SC)  
Intercept              -0.0005      0.0004            0.0081              -0.0116 
    (t-statistics)            (-0.4930)     (0.5662)           (3.4458)                 (-6.6942)a  
SMB      0.5910               0.3080                   0.6340        -0.0457 
(t-statistics)           (36.8353)a     (17.4922)a           (16.9791)a              (-1.4668) 
HML      0.1700                0.4830          0.0400                   -0.1330        
(t-statistics)            (5.8281)b    (11.6113)a           (0.9362)                  (4.6337)c 
MKTRF      1.1660               1.0680                   1.2290               -0.0634        
(t-statistics)           (86.2341)a    (32.7398)a           (47.3100)a              (-2.4275) 
MM                             0.1800                 -0.1990                  -0.8150   0.9930 
    (t-statistics)           (21.4435)a            (-14.3461)a            (-28.7897)a             (36.7326)a 
Adj. R2                         94.33%                93.03%                  93.63%                   84.90% 
 
Panel D: Carhart four factor regressions with short-selling constraints (SC) added 
Intercept             -0.0010       0.0014             0.0054              -0.0093 
    (t-statistics)            (-0.9330)     (1.3775)            (2.3616)                (-5.8003)b  
SMB      0.5640                0.3580                   0.4950         0.0817 
(t-statistics)            (36.7031)a     (15.6151)a           (13.5834)a               (1.7953) 
HML      0.1920                0.4440           0.1540                   0.0344        
(t-statistics)             (7.5886)a    (12.3264)a            (3.4477)       (0.9792) 
MKTRF      1.1590                1.1080                   1.1930               -0.0324         
(t-statistics)            (83.6023)a    (32.9764)a           (43.3351)a               (-1.0367) 
MM                              0.1910                 -0.2180                   -0.7560   0.9430 
    (t-statistics)            (18.3560)a           (-13.0905)a             (-17.4548)a             (24.7925)a 
SC                               -0.0504                 0.0903                    -0.2670   0.2310 
    (t-statistics)            (-2.1825)              (2.8571)                 (-4.5796)c               (4.0658)c 



















Table 11. Short-squeeze Risk & Factor Models 
OLS regressions are run from January 1988 to December 2005 to test the relationship between 
momentum returns and a measure of short-squeeze risk (SS).  Short-squeeze risk is defined as 
SIR/ (IOS- SIR), where SIR is the short interest ratio, IOS is the institutional ownership scaled 
by the total number of shares outstanding.  Dependent variable is the average monthly returns of 
the portfolios from the momentum strategy in excess of risk free rate.  P0 represent the returns 
from the winner portfolio, P2 represent the returns from the loser portfolio, P0-P2 represents the 
return differences between the winner and loser portfolios.  Panel A shows the coefficient 
estimates of Fama-French three factor regression: = ∗ ∗ ∗
.	  is the monthly average portfolio returns;   is the monthly Treasury bill rate (i.e. 
risk-free interest rate),  (MKTRF) is the monthly Fama-French excess return on the 
market, SMB is the monthly Fama-French small firm factor, HML is the monthly Fama-French 
book-to-market (value) factor.  Panel B shows the coefficient estimates of the four factor model 
with three Fama-French factors and the short-squeeze risk, SS.  Panel C shows the coefficient 
estimates of the Carhart four factor model, with three Fama-French factors and the momentum 
factor, MM.  Panel D shows the coefficient estimates of the five factor model with three Fama-
French factors, the momentum factor and the short-squeeze risk, SS.  The table reports t-statistics, 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and Bogelsang (2002) 
approach.  Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, b and c, respectively. 
           P0 (winners)           P1           P2 (losers)       P0-P2  
Panel A: Fama-French three factor regressions without short-squeeze risk (SS) 
Intercept              0.0063       0.0031             0.0016                 0.0015 
    (t-statistics)             (8.1594)a      (4.9211)b              (1.0860)      (2.0579) 
SMB      0.8900                0.5230                   0.8370                   0.0575 
(t-statistics)            (38.9594)a      (12.7320)a            (6.2838)a      (0.4929) 
HML      0.1690                0.4470           0.1890         -0.0160 
(t-statistics)             (7.0122)a      (14.8594)a            (1.6197)      (-0.1345) 
MKTRF      0.9890                0.9040                   1.2770         -0.2890 
(t-statistics)            (43.0277)a     (50.2886)a             (18.0431)a      (-3.1690) 
Adj. R2                         92.46%                 89.16%                 67.00%                    3.75%    
 
Panel B: Fama-French three factor regressions with short-squeeze risk (SS) added 
Intercept              0.0041      0.0021            -0.0011              -0.0019 
    (t-statistics)  (6.6934)a     (3.6094)           (-0.6815)                 (1.5777)  
SMB      0.8380               0.5000                    0.7750         0.0667 
(t-statistics)            (39.7988)a     (13.2005)a           (6.3866)a                 (0.6279) 
HML      0.1100               0.4200           0.1170                   -0.0053       
(t-statistics)             (4.4289)c    (12.0089)a            (1.3078)      (-0.0503) 
MKTRF      1.1250               0.9660                    1.4420               -0.3130         
(t-statistics)            (63.5394)a    (53.6645)a           (20.0027)a              (-5.3927)b 
SS                                -0.3230                 -0.1480                   -0.3900   0.0577 
    (t-statistics)            (-6.3342)a            (-12.9815)a             (-4.9748)b               (0.4718) 




Table 11. (continued) 
           P0 (winners)          P1           P2 (losers)        P0-P2  
Panel C: Carhart four factor regressions without short-squeeze risk (SS)  
Intercept              0.0046      0.0048             0.0095              -0.0081 
    (t-statistics)  (7.6497)a     (9.8513)a           (5.1670)b                (-6.0275)a  
SMB      0.8610                0.5520                   0.9700        -0.1040 
(t-statistics)            (24.5103)a     (19.5653)a           (12.9767)a               (-2.3850) 
HML      0.1970                0.4200           0.0613                    0.1390        
(t-statistics)            (13.2577)a    (23.6317)a            (0.5402)      (1.2893) 
MKTRF      1.0410                0.8520                   1.0380                0.0017         
(t-statistics)            (87.8889)a    (31.3061)a           (28.1192)a              (-0.0389) 
MM                              0.1570                 -0.1590                  -0.7260   0.8820 
    (t-statistics)            (8.5183)a             (-12.1124)a             (-17.8082)a            (15.6383)a 
Adj. R2                         94.19%                 92.68%                   87.40%                  74.91% 
 
Panel D: Carhart four factor regressions with short-squeeze risk (SS) added 
Intercept              0.0029       0.0036             0.0057               -0.0062 
    (t-statistics)  (6.1466)a      (7.4953)a            (3.4344)                 (-4.9807)b  
SMB      0.8190                0.5230                   0.8800         -0.0571 
(t-statistics)            (27.1451)a     (21.2463)a           (12.9215)a               (-1.2677) 
HML      0.1420                0.3810          -0.0583                     0.2010        
(t-statistics)             (7.2207)a     (14.7557)a           (-0.7152)       (2.2322) 
MKTRF      1.1540                -0.9300                  1.2820               -0.1250         
(t-statistics)            (37.7151)a     (44.7557)a           (50.5027)a               (-2.7756) 
MM                              0.1400                 -0.1710                   -0.7640   0.9020 
    (t-statistics)            (9.3347)a              (-14.5641)a            (-16.7345)a              (15.2413)a 
SS                               -0.2830                  0.1970                   -0.6090   0.3160 
    (t-statistics)            (-7.0444)a             (-13.9530)a            (-9.7758)a                (3.9802)c 



















Table 12. Momentum Returns with and without NASDAQ Stocks 
This table reports the monthly returns for momentum portfolios (6,0,6) formed based on past-six-
month returns and held for six months without skip.  P1 (past winners) is the equally-weighted 
portfolio of 10% of the stocks with the highest returns during the past six months; P10 (past 
losers) is the equally-weighted portfolio of the 10% of the stocks with lowest returns during the 
past six months.  P0-P10 represents the return difference between the winner and loser portfolios.  
Difference represents the different returns between the groups of stocks from all markets and 
stocks without NASDAQ market.  Panel A shows the returns from the stocks included this study, 
and Panel B demonstrates the returns from all the common stocks in the market.  Returns are 
reported in decimal points per month.  The table reports t-statistics, adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and Bogelsang (2002) approach.  
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, b and c, respectively. 
          All Stocks   NYSE+AMEX               Difference   
Panel A: Momentum strategy using the data in this study 
P0 (winners)                  0.0231        0.0226                0.0005                 
    (t-statistics)               (13.9428)a                 (17.6230)a                   (0.4981)   
P10 (losers)          0.0226                          0.0189                  0.0037   
(t-statistics)                (8.0942)a                      (10.0531)a                   (1.9567) 
P0-P10          0.0005                          0.0037                 -0.0032                                   
(t-statistics)                (0.2644)                        (2.4249)             (-1.8155) 
 
Panel B: Momentum strategy using all the firms in the market 
P0 (winners)                  0.0185                         0.0165         0.0020           
    (t-statistics)                (8.5929)a                     (10.6465)a                   (2.1771)  
P10 (losers)          0.0153                         0.0087                  0.0066   
(t-statistics)                (7.3688)a                      (4.0737)c        (6.2740)a 
P0-P10          0.0032                         0.0078                  -0.0046      




















Table 13. NASDAQ Effect 
T tests with unequal variances on short interest ratio (SIR) and short-selling constraints (SC) are 
run between NASDAQ and NYSE & AMEX stocks in Panel A.  Panel B runs a linear regression 
of SC on the indicator variable NASDAQ with heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.  
NASDAQ is a binary variable, which takes on value 1 when the stock is listed in NASDAQ and 
0 when it is listed on NYSE & AMEX.   T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, b and c, respectively.  
                    SIR                             SC 
Panel A: T test with unequal variances 
NASDAQ    0.0197              0.1648 
NYSE & AMEX          0.0285                                 0.2022 
Difference              -0.0088                       -0.0378 
    (t-statistics)              (-65.88)a                                               (-129.98)a 
 
Panel B: Regression with robust standard error 
Constants        0.2022 
    (t-statistics)            (1273.55)a 
NASDAQ                  -0.0374 
    (t-statistics)            (-129.98)a 





Table 14. Summary Statistics of Pilot and Control Sample before the Pilot Program 
Summary statistics of the Pilot and Control samples in different markets over the four month 
period prior to the start of the Pilot program on May 2, 2005 are reported.  Only stocks that exist 
both in the pre-pilot and pilot period for at least one month, and in the regression data in Table 
IV are included in this analysis.  The statistical difference between the Pilot and Control samples 
is tested using two-sample t-tests.  N is the average number of firms in the samples, TURN is 
turnover, SIR is short interest ratio, SC is short-selling constraints, MB is market-to-book ratio.  
∆ is the difference of the above variables investigated between Pilot and Control samples.  T-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, 
b and c, respectively.  
Variable    NYSE & AMEX            NASDAQ 
                   Pilot      Control      ∆      (t-statistics)     Pilot      Control       ∆       (t-statistics) 
N         384         376    759     826 
TURN      0.1422    0.1435   -0.0013    (-0.21)        0.0996     0.1002     -0.0006       (-0.09) 
SIR      0.0423    0.0412    0.0011     (0.34)         0.0523     0.0433      0.0090       (2.74)a 
SC            0.2194    0.2189    0.0004     (0.13)         0.1736     0.1802     -0.0065       (-1.58) 





Table 15. Pilot Program Effect 
This table summarizes how stock characteristics change after the tick and bid tests are removed.  
Paired t-tests are run separately on pilot and control samples for direct comparisons on monthly 
short interest ratio (SIR), short-selling constraints (SC), turnover (TURN), and market-to-book 
ratio (MB) before and after the Pilot program which started in May 2, 2005.  NYSE & AMEX 
and NASDAQ are investigated separately for the potential differences between tick and bid tests 
or different trading environment between the two markets.  Pre-Pilot is the four-month period 
before the starting date of the Pilot program in 2005, Pilot is the eight-month period in 2005 after 
the program started.  ∆ is the difference of the variables investigated, between the “Pre-Pilot” 
and “Pilot” periods within both pilot and control samples.  Two-sample t-tests are run on the 
difference of the differences between the pilot and control samples.  T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, b and c, respectively.  
            Pilot Sample                       Control Sample           Pilot ∆- 
Variable  Market          Pre-Pilot  Pilot      ∆        Pre-Pilot  Pilot        ∆        Control ∆ 
SIR     Listed           0.0423    0.0434    0.0011     0.0412    0.0454    0.0043      -0.0032 
    (t-statistics)                                 (0.66)              (5.19)a       (-1.72)c 
                NASDAQ    0.0523    0.0576    0.0052     0.0433    0.0538    0.0105      -0.0053         
    (t-statistics)                                 (4.07)a                                   (11.16)a     (-3.32)a 
SC     Listed        0.2194    0.2222    0.0028     0.2189    0.2216     0.0027      0.0001 
    (t-statistics)                                 (2.13)b                                   (2.25)b       (0.06) 
                NASDAQ    0.1730    0.1731    0.0001     0.1796    0.1789    -0.0006      0.0007 
    (t-statistics)                                 (0.06)                                     (-0.42)       (0.30)   
TURN     Listed           0.1422   0.1417     -0.0005    0.1435    0.1439    0.0004      -0.0009 
    (t-statistics)                                 (-0.19)                                    (0.17)        (-0.26) 
                NASDAQ    0.0096   0.0981    -0.0015     0.1002   0.0964     -0.0038      0.0023 
    (t-statistics)                                 (-0.45)                                   (-1.47)         (0.54) 
MB     Listed           3.5226    3.4468   -0.0758     4.6555   4.0223    -0.6332      -0.5574 
    (t-statistics)                                 (-0.29)                                   (1.77)c        (1.27) 
                NASDAQ    4.2651    4.8204    0.5554     8.9453   4.9418     -4.0034      -4.5588 




















 This dissertation studies the sources of abnormal returns from the momentum strategy.  
This market anomaly has puzzled researchers in finance for the past two decades.   
The first essay decomposes the momentum expected returns from a mathematical model.  
The empirical results from the historical data show that own-stock autocovariance is an 
important source in generating momentum returns.  More interestingly, the own-stock 
autocovariance comes primarily from the loser portfolio.  Therefore, stock returns are correlated 
between two consecutive time periods.  The market may not be as efficient as we previously 
believed.   
Based on the findings of the first essay, the second essay attempts to find the explanation 
for the own-stock return autocorrelation, especially from the loser portfolio.  The empirical 
results indicate that short-selling constraints and risks are the key to this asymmetric 
phenomenon.  Stocks with more severe short-selling constraints prevent pessimistic information 
from being released into the stock prices more quickly; and thus causes those stocks to be 
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